


78-572

No.



In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, ET AL., Petitioners

v.

JOHN M. GERAGHTY

**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT**

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INDEX

	Page
OPINION BELOW	1
JURISDICTION	2
QUESTIONS PRESENTED	2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED	3
STATEMENT	6
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION	13
CONCLUSION	31

CITATIONS

CASES:

<i>Aetna Casualty Co. v. Flowers</i> , 330 U.S. 464	22
<i>Ahrens v. Thomas</i> , 570 F.2d 286	17
<i>Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co.</i> , No. 77-380 (May 31, 1978)	11
<i>Autrey v. Williams and Dunlap</i> , 343 F.2d 730	21
<i>Bailey v. Patterson</i> , 369 U.S. 31	14
<i>Banks v. Multi-Family Management, Inc.</i> , 554 F.2d 127	17-18
<i>Banks v. United States</i> , 553 F.2d 37	28
<i>Baxter v. Palmigiano</i> , 425 U.S. 308	18
<i>Board of School Commissioners v. Jacobs</i> , 420 U.S. 128	10, 14
<i>Boyd v. Justices of Special Term</i> , 546 F.2d 526	15, 17
<i>Califano v. Sanders</i> , 430 U.S. 99	11
<i>Continental Can Co. v. Horton</i> , 250 F.2d 637	21
<i>Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay</i> , No. 76-1836 (June 21, 1978)	18
<i>D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Loflin</i> , 440 F.2d 1213	21
<i>Davis v. Romney</i> , 490 F.2d 1360	20
<i>Doctor v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R.</i> , 540 F.2d 699	20
<i>Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.</i> , 424 U.S. 747 ..	15
<i>Garcia v. United States Board of Parole</i> , 557 F.2d 100	28

<i>Gardner v. Westinghouse</i> , No. 77-650 (June 21, 1978)	18
<i>Gerstein v. Pugh</i> , 420 U.S. 103	16, 17, 18
<i>Hormel v. Helvering</i> , 312 U.S. 552	21
<i>Inmates v. Owens</i> , 561 F.2d 560	15
<i>Lasky v. Quinlan</i> , 558 F.2d 1133	15
<i>Kremens v. Bartley</i> , 431 U.S. 119	14
<i>Kuahula v. Employers Insurance of Wausau</i> , 557 F.2d 1334	15
<i>Mancusi v. Stubbs</i> , 408 U.S. 204	22
<i>Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co.</i> , 511 F.2d 1073	19
<i>Napier v. Gertrude</i> , 542 F.2d 825, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049	15, 18
<i>O'Shea v. Littleton</i> , 414 U.S. 488	15
<i>Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler</i> , 427 U.S. 424	15
<i>Preiser v. Rodriguez</i> , 411 U.S. 475	8
<i>Roach v. Board of Pardons and Paroles</i> , 503 F.2d 1367	10
<i>Ruip v. United States</i> , 555 F.2d 1331	30
<i>Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh</i> , 538 F.2d 991	19
<i>Satterwhite v. City of Greenville</i> , No. 75-3377 (Aug. 23, 1978)	15, 20
<i>Shepard v. Taylor</i> , 556 F.2d 648	30
<i>Smith v. Merchants & Farmers Bank of West Helena</i> , 574 F.2d 982	20
<i>Sosna v. Iowa</i> , 419 U.S. 393	14, 18
<i>Swisher v. Brady</i> , No. 77-653 (June 28, 1978)	17
<i>United Airlines v. McDonald</i> , 432 U.S. 385	18
<i>United States v. Braasch</i> , appealed dismissed and mandamus denied, 542 F.2d 442	7
<i>United States v. Braasch</i> , 505 F.2d 139, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910	6
<i>United States v. DiRusso</i> , 535 F.2d 673	25
<i>United States v. Grayson</i> , No. 76-1572 (June 26, 1978)	28, 30
<i>Vun Cannon v. Breed</i> , 565 F.2d 1096	15, 17
<i>Warden v. Marrero</i> , 417 U.S. 653	29
<i>Williams v. Wohlgenuth</i> , 540 F.2d 163	17
<i>Windham v. American Brands, Inc.</i> , 565 F.2d 59	20
<i>Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings & Loan Association</i> , 560 F.2d 271, cert. denied, No. 77-1020 (March 20, 1978)	16

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, REGULATION AND RULES:

United States Constitution:

Article I, Section 9, clause 3	3
Article III	14
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701-706	11
Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219, 18 U.S.C. 4201 <i>et seq.</i>	3, 8
18 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 4203	3, 24
18 U.S.C. 4203(a)(1)	3, 25
18 U.S.C. 4203(b)	3, 25
18 U.S.C. 4205	23
18 U.S.C. 4205(a)	12
18 U.S.C. 4205(b)(1)	12, 24
18 U.S.C. (1976 ed.) 4205(b)(2)	9, 12, 24
18 U.S.C. 4206	4
18 U.S.C. 4206(a)	4, 9, 24, 25, 26
18 U.S.C. 4206(c)	4, 27
18 U.S.C. 4206(d)	4, 24, 26
18 U.S.C. 4207	5, 26
18 U.S.C. 4207(4)	5, 26
18 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 4208(a)(2)	9
18 U.S.C. 4218(c)	11
18 U.S.C. 1623	6
18 U.S.C. 1951	6
28 U.S.C. 1331	8, 11
28 U.S.C. 1361	8
28 U.S.C. 1406	8
28 U.S.C. 2255	8

28 C.F.R. 2.20	6, 7, 25
§ 2.20(d)	30
§ 2.20(c)	30
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23	5, 18, 19
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)	19
Fed. R. Crim. P. 35	6

MISCELLANEOUS:

122 Cong. Rec. H1500 (daily ed. March 3, 1976)	27
122 Cong. S2572 (daily ed. March 2, 1976)	27
D. Stanley, <i>Prisoners Among Us: The Problem of Parole</i> (1976)	25
38 Fed. Reg. 31942	25, 28
3B J. Moore, <i>Federal Practice</i> ¶ 23.02-2 (2d ed. 1977)	20
Project, <i>Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process</i> , 84 Yale L.J. 810 (1975)	25
7A C. Wright & A. Miller, <i>Federal Practice and Procedures</i> § 1798 (1972)	20
S. Rep. No. 94-369, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)	26, 27
S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-648, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ..	27
H.R. Rep. No. 94-184, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)	26
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ..	27

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The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States Parole Commission, the Attorney General of the United States, and the Superintendent of the Federal Prison at Allenwood, Pennsylvania, petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in this case.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. A, *infra*, 1a-73a) is reported at 579 F.2d 238. The opinion of the district court (App. D, *infra*, 77a-93a) is reported at 429 F. Supp. 737.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (App. B, *infra*, 74a-75a) was entered on March 9, 1978. A petition for rehearing with a suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied on May 8, 1978 (App. C, *infra*, 76a). On July 28, 1978, Mr. Justice Brennan extended the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including September 5, 1978, and on August 24, 1978, he further extended the time for filing a petition to and including October 5, 1978. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the court of appeals should have dismissed the appeal in this case where the claim of the individual plaintiff concerning his eligibility for parole had been made moot by the expiration of his criminal sentence and where class action certification had been denied by the district court.

2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in failing, sua sponte, to construct and certify an appropriate subclass after the court had properly determined that the plaintiff's claims were not representative of the class that had been proposed for certification.

3. Whether the Parole Commission's parole release guidelines violate the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act by failing to give consideration to the length of a prisoner's sentence in parole release determinations.

4. Whether application of the Commission's parole release guidelines to prisoners sentenced prior to the effective date of the guidelines constitutes an unconstitutional ex post facto enhancement of criminal sentences.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

1. Article I, Section 9, clause 3 of the United States Constitution provides:

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

2. The Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219, 18 U.S.C. 4201 *et seq.*, provides in pertinent part:

A. 18 U.S.C. 4203:

(a) The Commission * * * shall—

(1) promulgate rules and regulations establishing guidelines for the powers enumerated in subsection (b) of this section and such other rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out a national parole policy and the purpose of this chapter;

* * *

(b) The Commission * * * shall have the power to—

(1) grant or deny an application or recommendation to parole any eligible prisoner;

(2) impose reasonable conditions on an order granting parole;

(3) modify or revoke an order paroling any eligible prisoner; * * *

* * *

B. 18 U.S.C. 4206:

(a) If an eligible prisoner has substantially observed the rules of the institution or institutions to which he has been confined, and if the Commission, upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the prisoner, determines:

(1) that release would not depreciate the seriousness of his offense or promote disrespect for the law; and

(2) that release would not jeopardize the public welfare;

subject to the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, and pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the Commission pursuant to section 4203(a)(1), such prisoner shall be released.

* * * * *

(c) The Commission may grant or deny release on parole notwithstanding the guidelines referred to in subsection (a) of this section if it determines there is good cause for so doing * * *.

C. 18 U.S.C. 4206(d):

Any prisoner, serving a sentence of five years or longer, who is not earlier released under this section or any other applicable provision of law, shall be released on parole after having served two-thirds of each consecutive term or terms, or after serving thirty years of each consecutive term or terms of more than forty-five years including any life term, whichever is earlier: *Provided, however,* That the Commission shall not release such prisoner if it determines that he has seriously or frequently violated institution rules and regulations or that there is a reasonable probability that he will commit any Federal, State, or local crime.

D. 18 U.S.C. 4207:

In making a determination under this chapter (relating to release on parole) the Commission shall consider, if available and relevant:

(1) reports and recommendations which the staff of the facility in which such prisoner is confined may make;

(2) official reports of the prisoner's prior criminal record, including a report or record of earlier probation and parole experiences;

(3) presentence investigation reports;

(4) recommendations regarding the prisoner's parole made at the time of sentencing by the sentencing judge; and

(5) reports of physical, mental, or psychiatric examination of the offender.

There shall also be taken into consideration such additional relevant information concerning the prisoner (including information submitted by the prisoner) as may be reasonably available.

3. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:

(a) * * * One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if * * * (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class * * *.

* * * * *

(c) * * *

(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subsection may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.

* * * * *

(4) When appropriate * * * (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.

* * * * *

4. The pertinent portions of the Guidelines adopted by the Parole Commission for parole release determinations, 28 C.F.R. 2.20, are reproduced in the appendix to the opinion of the court of appeals (App. A, *infra*, 67a-73a).

STATEMENT

1. Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, respondent, a former Chicago police sergeant, was convicted of conspiracy to commit extortion through the use of his position as a vice squad officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951, and of making false declarations to a grand jury concerning his involvement in the extortion scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1623. On January 25, 1974, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of four years' imprisonment on the conspiracy count and one year's imprisonment on the false declarations count. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. *United States v. Braasch*, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).

Thereafter, respondent applied for and obtained a reduction in his sentence to 30 months' imprisonment pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (App. D, *infra*, 71a). The district court ordered this reduction on the basis of a finding that

application to respondent of the parole release Guidelines (28 C.F.R. § 2.20),¹ which had been promulgated by the Parole Commission just prior to the date on which the initial sentence was imposed, would frustrate the expectation of the sentencing court. *United States v. Braasch*, No. 72 CR 979 (N.D. Ill. 1975), appeal dismissed and mandamus denied, 542 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1976).

Respondent then applied for release on parole. On January 13, 1976, his application for parole was denied with the following explanation (App. A, *infra*, 5a):

Your offense has been rated as very high severity. You have a salient factor score of 11. You have been in custody for a total of 4 months. Guidelines established by the Board for adult cases which consider the above factors indicate a range of 26-36 months to be served before release for cases with good institutional program performance and adjustment. After review of all relevant factors and information presented, it is found that a decision at this consideration outside the guidelines does not appear warranted.

Respondent's second application for parole was denied for similar reasons on July 7, 1976, and he was continued without further consideration of parole until the expiration of his term of imprisonment (*id.* at 6a).

¹ The background of the Parole Commission Guidelines and the parole release process are discussed in our petitions for writs of certiorari in *United States v. Addonizio*, No. 78-156, and *United States v. Edwards*, No. 78-157. Those cases present the question whether a district court may revise a lawful sentence on the ground that decisions of the Parole Commission frustrate the sentencing expectations of the sentencing court. We are sending counsel for respondent copies of our petitions in *Addonizio* and *Edwards*.

2. On September 15, 1976, respondent filed this civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief (App. D, *infra*, 78a). The complaint alleged that the Parole Commission's Guidelines are invalid under the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219, 18 U.S.C. 4201 *et seq.*, and that the Guidelines violate the ex post facto prohibition of the Constitution by authorizing the Commission to make deferred sentencing decisions (App. D, *infra*, 83a-84a). Respondent moved for certification of the case as a class action on behalf of "all federal prisoners who have been or will become eligible for release on parole" (*id.* at 82a n.9).

On November 12, 1976, the action was transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, where respondent was then incarcerated (*id.* at 78a).² Respondent moved for summary judgment and, on February 24, 1977, the district court ruled that only issues of law were presented and the case was therefore "ripe for disposition" without an evidentiary hearing (*ibid.*).

The court first rejected respondent's request for class action certification. Class certification was found

² The district court in the District of Columbia construed the action as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and thus transferred the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1406 and 2255. The district court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania noted that jurisdiction for the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by petitioner would ordinarily rest upon 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1361. The court held, however, that since the relief sought is "in effect, a request for a ruling that petitioner is entitled to release on parole" (App. D, *infra*, 80a), habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy (*ibid.*, citing, e.g., *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)).

inappropriate because "not all members of the [proposed] class have the same interest" in challenging the validity of the parole Guidelines (*id.* at 83a). Some prisoners may find their actual or expected parole release date advanced by virtue of the Guidelines and thus would not share respondent's claim that the Guidelines improperly delay release (*ibid.*).³ The court also rejected respondent's claim that class action certification should be granted merely "to ensure that the legal issues presented" are not made moot by the expiration of respondent's criminal sentence (*id.* at 82a).

Turning to the merits, the court held that the parole Guidelines are consistent with the provisions of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act and that the Guidelines do not offend the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The court noted that the Guidelines were consistent with the requirements of the Act that the parole decision be made "pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the Commission," 18 U.S.C. 4206(a), and be based on the "nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and char-

³ The district court also held that class certification was inappropriate as to other claims that were inapplicable to all members of the class. Two issues—the classification of respondent's offense as extortion under the Guidelines and respondent's access to certain Commission files—were found by the court to relate solely to the circumstances of respondent's individual case (App. D, *infra*, 82a). Similarly, respondent's claim that the guidelines are inconsistent with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 4208(a)(2) (now 18 U.S.C. (1976 ed.) 4205(b)(2)), under which respondent was sentenced, was found not to have applicability to those members of the proposed class who were sentenced under different statutes (*id.* at 83a).

acteristics of the prisoner' " (App. D, *infra*, 87a) (emphasis in original). Moreover, the Guidelines did not effect an ex post facto enhancement of the respondent's sentence because parole involves the administrative implementation of the sentence and "is not a form of sentencing or a modification of sentence" (*id.* at 85a n.10, citing *Roach v. Board of Pardons and Paroles*, 503 F.2d 1367, 1368 (8th Cir. 1974)).

3. a. Respondent filed a timely notice of appeal. While the appeal was pending, respondent's term of imprisonment expired and he was released from prison (App. A, *infra*, 6a). The Parole Commission then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The court of appeals deferred disposition of this motion pending consideration of the appeal on the merits. On March 9, 1978, over seven months after respondent had been released, the court of appeals entered its decision reversing the judgment of the district court and remanding for further proceedings.

The court acknowledged that respondent's individual claim became moot when his sentence expired. The court noted, however, that if a class action had been certified by the district court the mootness of respondent's personal claim would not bar further adjudication on behalf of the class (*id.* at 18a). See *Board of School Commissioners v. Jacobs*, 420 U.S. 128 (1975). Since the district court had declined to certify a class action in this case, there was neither a class nor an individual with a live controversy in the

court of appeals. But the court concluded that if a proper class *could* have been certified and the district court erred in failing to do so, the case could be remanded for class certification to preserve jurisdiction (App. A, *infra*, 28a).

With regard to the class certification question, the court of appeals agreed with the district court that the proposed class was too broad and that respondent's interests might conflict with other class members. The court held, however, that appropriate subclasses may exist and that the district court erred by not considering sua sponte the certification of such subclasses (*id.* at 32a). The court accordingly reversed the denial of class certification and remanded for the "evaluation of the proper subclasses * * *" (*ibid.*).

b. The court noted that a remand for class action certification would be an improvident dissipation of "judicial effort if the district court" had properly decided the merits of the case (*id.* at 32a-33a).⁴ The court therefore stated that it was necessary and appropriate for it "to consider the merits of [respondent's] claim" at that time (*id.* at 33a). The court noted that the Commission has admitted that no

⁴ The court held that the district court had jurisdiction in this case under 18 U.S.C. 4218(c) and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701-706. Since the complaint challenges not the manner in which the Guidelines were promulgated but their substantive validity, however, 18 U.S.C. 4218(c) provides no jurisdiction. Moreover, this Court held in *Califano v. Sanders*, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), that the APA is not a jurisdictional statute. We do not seek certiorari to review the jurisdictional holdings of the court of appeals, however, because respondent's allegation of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 is sufficient in this case. See *Andrus v. Charleston Stone Products Co.*, No. 77-380, decided May 31, 1978, slip op. 3-4 n.6.

weight is given to the length of a prisoner's sentence either in determining a prisoner's customary release date under the Guidelines or in making individual parole determinations (*id.* at 36a).⁵ The court concluded that the length of sentence was intended to be a relevant factor in the parole process under the Parole Commission and Reform Act, and that parole procedures that fail to take sentence length into account in exercising paroling discretion are inconsistent with that Act.⁶

The court further held that if the Guidelines are applied to prisoners sentenced before their effective date, and if they deprive any prisoner "of the possibility of a substantially more lenient punishment" that would result from the previously applicable parole procedures (*id.* at 58a), then the Guidelines, as applied, would violate the prohibition of the Ex Post Facto Clause (*id.* at 64a-65a). The court of appeals directed the district court to determine on remand whether the facts reveal that the Commission's Guidelines fail to give consideration to sentence length and result in enhanced punishment for prisoners that were sentenced prior to the Guidelines' effective date (*id.* at 65a, 66a).

⁵ Of course, the minimum and maximum sentence lengths established by the sentencing court (18 U.S.C. 4205(b)(1), (2)) determine the period during which the Commission has paroling discretion. See also 18 U.S.C. 4205(a).

⁶ The court also suggested that if the Act permits the Commission to disregard sentence length in the parole decisionmaking process, the statute may unconstitutionally infringe the judicial sentencing function (App. A, *infra*, 46a-50a).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The issues presented by this case are of substantial significance to class action litigation and to the proper administration of the federal parole system. The holding of the court of appeals that this case is not moot, even though there is no longer an individual litigant with a live controversy and even though no class action had been certified prior to the mooted of respondent's claims, departs from decisions of this Court and is in direct conflict with decisions in other circuits. Furthermore, the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider sua sponte whether a subclass of plaintiffs could be certified in this case imposes unreasonable duties on the trial court and is substantially at variance with accepted principles of class action litigation.

The court of appeals itself recognized (App. A, *infra*, 43a n.91, 61a-62a) that its holding that the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act and the Ex Post Facto Clause require the Commission to give consideration to sentence length in formulation of its parole release Guidelines and in making individual parole release determinations is in conflict with the decisions of other courts of appeals. The uncertainty created for federal prisoners by these disparate decisions, and the interference that the decision in this case creates for the effective management of the federal parole system, is manifest.

The decision of the court of appeals thus raise issues of substantial importance that should be resolved by this Court.

1. This Court has, on several occasions, elaborated the extent to which jurisdiction may continue for class action litigation when the claims of all individual litigants have become moot. In these decisions, the Court has held that the case as a whole becomes moot upon the termination of the claims of the named litigants "unless [the case] was duly certified as a class action" while the controversy remained live. *Board of School Commissioners v. Jacobs*, 420 U.S. 128, 129 (1975); *Sosna v. Iowa*, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975). See *Kremens v. Bartley*, 431 U.S. 119, 132-133 (1977).⁷ Consistent with "firmly established requirements" under Article III of the Constitution, there must be a "named plaintiff who has * * * a case or controversy at the time the complaint is filed, and at the time the class action is certified by the District Court pursuant to Rule 23 * * *." *Sosna v. Iowa*, *supra*, 419 U.S. at 402.⁸ Absent a live controversy based on the claim of either a named litigant or a "duly certified" class, the case lacks the concreteness and adversarial nature that is requisite to the maintenance of jurisdiction by federal courts. *Ibid.*; see

⁷ Even where a class has been "duly certified," the case becomes moot upon the termination of the claims of the named litigants if the issue raised in the case is not "capable of repetition, yet evading review," *Kremens v. Bartley*, *supra*, 431 U.S. at 133; *Board of School Commissioners v. Jacobs*, *supra*, 420 U.S. at 129, or if the class that was certified by the district court requires alteration due to subsequent developments in the case, *Kremens v. Bartley*, *supra*, 431 U.S. at 132.

⁸ "A litigant must be a member of the class which he or she seeks to represent at the time the class action is certified by the district court." 419 U.S. at 403, citing, e.g., *Bailey v. Patterson*, 369 U.S. 31 (1962).

also 419 U.S. at 412 (White, J., dissenting); *Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler*, 427 U.S. 424, 430 (1976); *Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.*, 424 U.S. 747, 755 (1976); *O'Shea v. Littleton*, 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1974).

In applying the principles of these decisions, the courts of appeals have ordinarily held that "in the absence of a properly certified class, the representative plaintiff whose claim has become moot is himself without a litigable grievance, and the person or persons on whose behalf he seeks to continue the litigation has or have not yet achieved jurisprudential existence. There being no adversary necessary for the creation of the constitutionally required case or controversy, jurisdiction is lacking." *Vun Cannon v. Breed*, 565 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). See *Inmates v. Owens*, 561 F.2d 560 (4th Cir. 1977); *Lasky v. Quinlan*, 558 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1977); *Kuahula v. Employers Insurance of Wausau*, 557 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977); *Boyd v. Justices of Special Term*, 546 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1976); *Napier v. Gertrude*, 542 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977).

The court of appeals held in this case, however, that if the class certification was improperly denied by the district court, the case is not moot even though the claim of the named litigant has expired (App. A, *infra*, 20a-21a).⁹ This decision is in direct conflict with the

⁹ The Fifth Circuit suggested in *dicta* in *Satterwhite v. City of Greenville*, No. 75-3377 (Aug. 23, 1978) (en banc), slip op. 6540-6541, that the court of appeals may retain jurisdiction in some circumstances where the denial of class

decision of the Seventh Circuit in *Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings & Loan Association*, 560 F.2d 271 (1977), cert. denied, No. 77-1020 (March 20, 1978). In *Winokur*, the named plaintiffs, whose individual claims were moot, sought to appeal the district court's denial of class certification. The court of appeals held that since no live controversy then existed, the court could not exercise jurisdiction "even to reverse the class action determination and thus instill a live controversy into the action." 560 F.2d at 276.

The court of appeals suggested, however, that its contrary decision in this case¹⁰ was consistent with a narrow exception to the mootness doctrine recognized by this Court in *Sosna v. Iowa*, *supra*, and applied in *Gerstein v. Pugh*, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). We submit that this conclusion misconstrues the pertinent decisions of this Court. In *Sosna*, the Court held that the case becomes moot if the claims of the named plaintiffs expire before class certification. 419 U.S. at 402. The Court stated, however, that "[t]here may be cases in which the controversy involving the named plaintiffs is such that it becomes moot as to them before the district court can reasonably be expected to rule on a cer-

certification was improper even though the individual claims of the named litigants had expired. In the same decision, however, the court noted that under *Sosna v. Iowa*, *supra*, "[i]t does not suffice [for jurisdiction] that such a certification would have been accorded but for some error * * *." Slip op. 6539 (emphasis in original).

¹⁰ The court recognized that its decision was in conflict with decisions in other circuits. See App. A, *infra*, 25a n.49.

tification motion." *Id.* at 402 n.11. Where a claim is "by nature temporary," and it is unlikely that any individual claim would survive "long enough for a district judge to certify the class," *Gerstein v. Pugh*, *supra*, 420 U.S. at 110 n.11, the claim is one "capable of repetition, yet evading review," and thus falls within the conventional exception to the mootness doctrine. *Ibid.* In these circumstances, the Court observed in *Sosna* that the class certification may be said to "'relate back' to the filing of the complaint" for purposes of determining jurisdiction. 419 U.S. at 402 n.11.

The "relation back" exception has been applied only in circumstances where the controversy is inherently temporary in nature and capable of evading judicial review even at the trial court level. See *Gerstein v. Pugh*, *supra* (challenge to legality of pretrial detention); *Ahrens v. Thomas*, 570 F.2d 286, 288-289 (8th Cir. 1978) (same); *Williams v. Wohlgemuth*, 540 F.2d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 1976) (eligibility for emergency assistance relief). See also *Swisher v. Brady*, No. 77-653 (June 28, 1978), slip op. 8-9 n.11. This case fails to come within this exception to the mootness doctrine because it does not involve a controversy "so transitory that mootness inevitably intervenes before the District Court can 'reasonably be expected to rule on a certification motion.'" *Boyd v. Justices of Special Term*, *supra*, 546 F.2d at 527 n.2. See *Swisher v. Brady*, *supra*; *Vun Cannon v. Breed*, *supra*, 565 F.2d at 1100-1101; *Banks v. Multi-Family*

Management, Inc., 554 F.2d 127, 128 (4th Cir. 1977); *Napier v. Gertrude*, *supra*, 542 F.2d at 828.¹¹ There is no basis for concluding here that persons imprisoned in federal penitentiaries are not likely to be in "custody long enough for a district judge to certify a class." *Gerstein v. Pugh*, *supra*, 420 U.S. at 111, n.11.¹² Indeed, almost a full year elapsed between respondent's second denial of parole and his release from custody, and the district court thus had ample time to rule—and it did rule—on respondent's certification request. Moreover, as the court of appeals conceded (App. A, *infra*, 26a), "some prisoners will retain their grievances long enough to achieve appellate review."

The court of appeals has misapplied the decisions of this Court and created a conflict with other circuits. Review of the decision in this case is warranted

¹¹ The court below erred in relying (App. A, *infra*, 23a) upon *Baxter v. Palmigiano*, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), and *United Airlines v. McDonald*, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). In *Baxter*, the Court refused to treat the case as a class action where the certification requirement of Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P., had not been complied with and the named plaintiffs' claims had become moot upon their release from prison. Instead, the Court held that another prisoner who had intervened as a named plaintiff could raise the claims in his own behalf. 425 U.S. at 310 n.1. In *McDonald*, no question of mootness was involved. The sole question before the Court was whether a post-judgment application for intervention was timely. 432 U.S. at 391.

¹² Nor, as the court below suggested (App. A, *infra*, 27a), do the restrictions on interlocutory appeals from class certification denials (see *Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay*, No. 76-1836 (June 21, 1978); *Gardner v. Westinghouse*, No. 77-650 (June 21, 1978) provide a proper basis for applying the "relation back" exception. While this may afford a basis in policy for granting review if the question is simply one of the exercise of discretion by the appellate court, it cannot confer jurisdiction where there is no cognizable case or controversy. See *Sosna v. Iowa*, *supra*, 419 U.S. at 401 n.9.

to settle this important question of federal jurisdiction.

2. While agreeing with the district court that the proposed class—consisting of all federal prisoners eligible for parole—was too broad, the court of appeals ruled that the district court abused its discretion under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by failing, *sua sponte*, to consider the creation of subclasses in this case.¹³ This holding creates serious difficulties for trial management of class action litigation and conflicts with principles concerning such litigation accepted by other courts of appeals.

The district court has authority under Rule 23(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to alleviate difficulties encountered or anticipated in the management of a class action by dividing the class into appropriate subclasses. The creation of such subclasses rests in the discretion of the trial court. *Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co.*, 511 F.2d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1975). No court has held, prior to the decision of the court of appeals in this case, that where the proposed class is overbroad, the district court abuses its discretion by failing to consider and construct subclasses even though the plaintiff has not requested it to do so.¹⁴

¹³ This ruling was crucial to the court's disposition of the case, since the court's "relation back" theory could justify revivification of an otherwise moot case only if the original refusal to certify a class action was erroneous.

¹⁴ The court of appeals' reliance (App. A, *infra*, 30a-31a) upon *Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh*, 538 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1976), is misplaced. In that case it was held that the district court had erred in concluding that a class

As a general principle, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish the propriety of his request for class action certification. See, e.g., *Smith v. Merchants & Farmers Bank of West Helena*, 574 F.2d 982, 983 (8th Cir. 1978); *Windham v. American Brands, Inc.*, 565 F.2d 59, 64 n.6 (4th Cir. 1977); *Doctor v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R.*, 540 F.2d 699, 706 (4th Cir. 1976); *Davis v. Romney*, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974). See also 3B J. Moore, *Federal Practice* ¶ 23.02-2, at 23-96 (2d ed. 1977); 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedures* § 1798, at 244-245 (1972). If the proposed class is overbroad or otherwise inappropriate, the plaintiff must retain the responsibility of demonstrating the suitability of proceeding with subclasses. "Counsel for the class have the primary responsibility for pressing a class action claim. They do not satisfy their responsibilities by simply affixing the class action label to a suit and depositing it with the clerk." *Satterwhite v. City of Greenville*, *supra*, slip op. 6544.

It is thus inconsistent with ordinary principles of class action litigation to require trial judges to pro-

action was unmanageable and that the district court's decertification of the class was therefore improper. The court added, in *dicta*, that even if the class action were unmanageable "the possible usefulness of subclasses" to avoid management problems should have been considered. 438 F.2d at 996. The decision does little more than point out the potential benefits of using subclasses to alleviate management difficulties; it did not adopt a rule placing an obligation on the district court to create appropriate subclasses on behalf of plaintiffs who have not sought subclass certification.

pose new theories or definitions of a class where the plaintiff has failed, whether due to lack of interest or otherwise, to suggest such an alternative. Moreover, placing the burden on the court, rather than on counsel, to propose subclass certification is contrary to the accepted principle that grounds for reversal may not ordinarily be urged on appeal that were available, but not raised, in the district court. See, e.g., *D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Loflin*, 440 F.2d 1213, 1215 (5th Cir. 1971); *Autrey v. Williams and Dunlap*, 343 F.2d 730, 750 (5th Cir. 1965); *Continental Can Co. v. Horton*, 250 F.2d 637, 645 (8th Cir. 1957).¹⁵

The rule adopted by the court of appeals will create unmanageable difficulties for the district courts. It will require trial courts to apply their limited resources in an effort to construct class certification theories that even plaintiff's counsel, possessing an adversarial interest in the litigation, has not imagined or thought worth raising. By placing this novel burden of advocacy on the trial court, the decision releases counsel from their ordinary and appropriate responsibility. It exposes the court to reversal and a renewal of proceedings with regard to matters that were not contested before it, and thus discourages

¹⁵ There is nothing to suggest that an order remanding for consideration of subclass certification would be necessary to correct manifest injustice, see *Hormel v. Helvering*, 312 U.S. 552, 556-557 (1941), in a case where the plaintiff did not request subclass certification until the case reached the court of appeals. If the case is dismissed by the court of appeals and other members of the proposed subclass in fact desire to litigate similar claims, they may initiate a new lawsuit in the district court.

efficient use of judicial resources by class action litigants.¹⁶

3. The court of appeals ruled that the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act requires the Commission, in formulating guidelines for the exercise of paroling discretion and in making parole decisions in individual cases, to take into account the sentence imposed by the court. This ruling, if correct, would require a wholesale revision of the present approach of the Commission to parole decisions—an approach approved by other courts of appeals and, we believe, specifically authorized by Congress in the Act—under which no weight is ordinarily given to sentence length in exercising paroling discretion. Although, for the reasons stated above, it is our view that the court

¹⁶ We note that the mandate of the court of appeals was issued to the district court on May 16, 1978, and that the Commission did not seek to stay issuance of the mandate while authorization for filing a petition for certiorari was being obtained. Following the decision to seek review in this Court, however, the Commission immediately moved in the district court, on August 18, 1978, for a stay of any further proceedings pending disposition of its petition for certiorari in this Court. The district court reserved decision on that motion. Thereafter, on August 22, 1978, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the class certification issue. At the conclusion of that hearing, however, the court reserved decision on this issue.

There is no reason to delay decision on the issues presented here pending the outcome of the district court proceedings. This Court has frequently recognized that issuance of the mandate by the court of appeals and action taken in compliance with the terms of the mandate do not defeat the jurisdiction of this Court. *E.g.*, *Mancusi v. Stubbs*, 408 U.S. 204, 205-207 (1972); *Aetna Casualty Co. v. Flowers*, 330 U.S. 464, 467 (1947). A timely petition for a writ of certiorari operates to suspend the finality of any judgment until this Court disposes of the case. If this Court grants certiorari and reverses the judgment of the court of appeals, that action nullifies the mandate of the court of appeals and, by the same token, any order of the district court that may be entered pursuant thereto.

lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits in this case, we deem it important to demonstrate the incorrectness of the court's decision and the significant adverse consequences it entails for the effective management of the federal parole system.

a. We note preliminarily that the court of appeals did not itself hold the present parole system invalid. Rather, it directed the district court to determine on remand whether the evidence supports the conclusion that the Guidelines give no weight to sentence length. The Commission admits, however, that no weight is given under the Guidelines to the length of the sentence, and it has acknowledged this in both courts below (App. A, *infra*, 36a). Thus, assuming the court of appeals had jurisdiction to decide the matter, its decision effectively determines the issue of the validity of the Guidelines, and the remand hearing on the merits would be a mere formality.

b. The sentence imposed upon a convicted offender defines the period during which he is eligible for release on parole. Thus, the sentence, in conjunction with statutory provisions for "good time" credits, sets the minimum required and maximum permissible period of confinement.¹⁷ The statute also provides that

¹⁷ Section 4205 establishes the minimum period of confinement before a convict may be released on parole, which is one-third of the total sentence (or ten years for any offender sentenced to a term in excess of 30 years), except that the sentencing court may provide either for immediate parole eligibility (Section 4205(b)(2)) or for parole eligibility after service of some specified period less than one-third of the sentence (Section 4205(b)(1)).

prisoners sentenced to a term of five years or longer are presumptively entitled to parole release after they have served two-thirds of their sentence (18 U.S.C. 4206(d)).¹⁸

During the period between the prisoner's first eligibility for parole and the two-thirds point, the Commission has substantial discretion to decide whether to grant release on parole, including the power to decline to give weight to the sentence imposed. Under 18 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 4203, which was in effect when respondent was sentenced, the Commission was entitled to consider any aspect of the public welfare in making its parole decision. Under the present statute, the Commission must consider whether release "would * * * depreciate the seriousness of [the] offense or promote disrespect for the law * * * [or] jeopardize the public welfare * * *" (18 U.S.C. 4206(a)).

Until 1970 the Commission exercised its discretion on a case-by-case basis, using no published criteria or guidelines. In response to widespread criticism that this led to arbitrary and erratic decisions, the Commission began to experiment with structured release criteria that were predicated upon the nature of the

¹⁸ Section 4206(d) permits parole to be withheld beyond the two-thirds point only where there is a history of frequent or serious violation of institutional rules or where the Commission concludes that there is a reasonable probability that the prisoner, if released, would commit new criminal offenses.

offense and the offender's personal characteristics.¹⁹ These offense and offender characteristics were assigned weights and converted into numerical values; after computing the numerical values, the prisoner and the Parole Commission could turn to a table to find a range (*e.g.*, 36 to 45 months) that most (but not all) of the persons with similar characteristics could expect to serve, with good institutional behavior, before release. The program was commenced in 1970, before respondent was sentenced, and it was revised in November 1973 (38 Fed. Reg. 31942). The present guidelines, codified at 28 C.F.R. 2.20, are the culmination of the Commission's "effort to introduce more consistency in parole decision-making" (*United States v. DiRusso*, 535 F.2d 673, 674 (1st Cir. 1976)).

The Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, enacted in 1976, did not repudiate the Commission's choice to exercise its discretion pursuant to parole release guidelines. To the contrary, the Act specifically directs the Commission to make its parole determinations "pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the Commission * * *." 18 U.S.C. 4206(a); see 18 U.S.C. 4203(a)(1), (b). While the Act directs the Commission to consider the seriousness of the offense, the need to preserve respect for the law, and the public welfare in making its parole determinations, 18 U.S.C.

¹⁹ For a history of this development and a description of the system, see D. Stanley, *Prisoners Among Us: The Problem of Parole* (1976); Project, *Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process*, 84 Yale L.J. 810 (1975).

4206(a),²⁰ the Act makes no mention of any obligation of the Commission to give consideration to the length of the prisoner's sentence in the exercise of its discretion.²¹

Congress was aware of the Commission's use of parole guidelines based on offense severity and offender characteristics when it enacted the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act. The legislative history of the Act reflects approval of the Commission's use of these guidelines to reduce the effects of sentencing disparity. The Conference Committee noted that

parole has the practical effect of balancing differences in sentencing policies and practices between judges and courts in a system that is as wide and diverse as the Federal criminal justice system. In performing this function, the parole authority must have in mind some notion of the appropriate range of time for an offense which will satisfy the legitimate needs of society to hold

²⁰ The Commission is also to consider the parole recommendation of the sentencing judge "made at the time of sentencing," 18 U.S.C. 4207(4), and other specified reports and recommendations. 18 U.S.C. 4207.

²¹ In the original version of the Act approved by the House of Representatives (H.R. 5727), the statute provided that a prisoner was to be released after serving one-third of his sentence unless the Commission established that the prisoner was not acceptable for release on the basis of specified criteria. H.R. Rep. No. 94-184, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1975). That provision was eliminated in the version of the Act that was adopted by the Senate. The Senate amendment, which was adopted in Conference, provided that a prisoner was to be eligible for release on parole after one-third of his sentence had been served but that, before granting parole, the Commission must determine that the prisoner was a proper candidate for release. S. Rep. No. 94-369, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 23 (1975); see note 22, *infra*. The presumptive entitlement to release that the House proposed at the completion of one-third of the sentence was provided instead at the two-thirds point under the Act. 18 U.S.C. 4206(d) (limited to prisoners serving a sentence of five years or more).

the offender accountable for his own acts. * * * The use of guidelines * * * will sharpen this process and improve the likelihood of good decisions.

S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-648, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976). See also S. Rep. No. 94-369, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1975). More specifically, the Conference Report states that

[t]he organization of parole decision-making along regional lines, the use of hearing examiners to prepare recommendations for action, and, *most importantly, the promulgation of guidelines to make parole less disparate and more understandable has met with such success that this legislation incorporates the system into the statute*, removes doubt as to the legality of changes implemented by administrative reorganization, and makes the improvements permanent.

S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-648, *supra* at 20 (emphasis supplied); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-838, *supra*, at 20. The conferees thus anticipated that parole release decisions would be based on the Guidelines and that deviations from the Guidelines would be warranted only upon a determination that there is "good cause for so doing." 18 U.S.C. 4206(c); see 122 Cong. Rec. S2572 (daily ed. March 2, 1976) (Sen. Burdick); S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-648, *supra*, at 23, 27; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-838, *supra*, at 23, 27.²²

²² As Congressman Kastenmeier explained, in describing the differences between the House and Senate versions of the legislation and the compromises reached by the conference committee (122 Cong. Rec. H1500 (daily ed. March 3, 1976)):

The primary disagreement between the House and Senate was the question of how much discretion should be retained by the Commission in

The holding of the court of appeals in this case is thus based on an incorrect understanding of the objectives of Congress in enacting the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act. The Commission is not usurping the judicial sentencing function by exercising its separate parole authority²³ in the precise manner that Congress intended. Two other courts of appeals have reviewed the same legislative history and concluded that the Commission's Guidelines are consistent with the Act. *Garcia v. United States Board of Parole*, 557 F.2d 100, 107 (7th Cir. 1977); *Banks v. United States*, 553 F.2d 37, 40 (8th Cir. 1977). The conflict created by the decision in this case has resulted in uncertainty for prisoners as to their parole opportunities and impeded the normal functioning of the Commission's decisionmaking process.

c. The court of appeals also erred in concluding that the parole Guidelines may violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution (App. A, *infra*, 55a-65a).²⁴ The court stated that the Guidelines appear

making release determinations once a prisoner is in fact eligible for parole. This was resolved by increasing the role of the parole determination guidelines and by granting the Commission the option of acting outside the guidelines in extraordinary cases.

²³ See *United States v. Grayson*, No. 76-1572 (June 26, 1978), slip op. 6.

²⁴ It should be noted that respondent was sentenced on January 25, 1974, two months after the guidelines were formally promulgated (38 Fed. Reg. 31942 (November 19, 1973)), and that respondent's sentence was reduced in October 1975 when the sentencing court became aware of the guidelines (see pp. 6-7, *supra*). In these circumstances, even if a class action had been certified by the district court, it is questionable whether respondent would be a suitable representative for any claim based upon the alleged ex post facto effect of the Guidelines.

to narrow the broad discretion that the Commission had previously exercised in its parole decisions and that, by unduly structuring the parole process, the Guidelines deprive prisoners "of the possibility of a substantially more lenient punishment" (*id.* at 58a). The court reasoned that the "possibility of a substantially more lenient punishment" was a part of each prisoner's sentence prior to promulgation of the Guidelines,²⁵ and that depriving prisoners of this "possibility" would constitute increased punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause (*id.* at 58a-65a). While it appeared to the court that the Guidelines act as an "unyielding conduit" to impose substantial limitations on the Commission's discretion to grant parole, and that application of the Guidelines to previously sentenced prisoners therefore violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, the court directed the district to hold a factual hearing on the issue on remand.²⁶

There is no justification for a factual hearing on remand. By providing a range of months within which release may ordinarily be expected, the Guidelines do

²⁵ The court of appeals relied, in part, on *Warden v. Marrero*, 417 U.S. 653 (1974), for this aspect of its analysis. In *Warden*, the Court held that a prisoner sentenced under a statute barring parole does not become eligible for parole when the prohibition against parole is repealed by subsequent legislation. The Court concluded that parole ineligibility was part of the sentence imposed under the original statute. *Id.* at 658-664. This precedent does not support the use to which it was put by the court of appeals.

²⁶ The court suggested that the Guidelines might be constitutional "if in practice the parole authorities found good cause to deviate from the guidelines in 60% of the cases * * *" (*id.* at 64a). The court noted, however, that the Parole Commission admitted that parole was granted prior to the customary release date under the Guidelines in only 8.7% of the cases (*ibid.*).

not require the Commission to follow any fixed formula in reaching dispositions in particular cases. The Commission remains free to assign a severity rating different from that listed in the guidelines where mitigating or aggravating circumstances are present. 28 C.F.R. 2.20(d). The Commission may also make decisions outside the guidelines where the circumstances warrant. *Id.* at 2.20(c). To the extent there was a "possibility of a substantially more lenient punishment" prior to adoption of the Guidelines, that possibility remains. More fundamentally, however, pursuant to the traditional allocation of responsibilities between the sentencing judge and the parole authorities (see *United States v. Grayson*, No. 76-1572 (June 26, 1978), slip op. 6), parole officials have always retained the broadest discretion over parole release determinations (see pp. 23-28, *supra*). The Guidelines do no more than provide structure to that continuing exercise of discretion and thus do not alter any justified expectation of parole eligibility.

Other courts of appeals have rejected the claim that the Guidelines constitute an *ex post facto* law. In *Ruip v. United States*, 555 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1977), the court held that application of the Guidelines to previously sentenced prisoners is permissible because the Parole Commission has been given "absolute discretion" in parole matters and the Guidelines merely "assist [the Commission] in attaining a more uniform exercise of its discretion" (*id.* at 1335, 1336). Similarly, in *Shepard v. Taylor*, 556 F.2d 648 (2d Cir.

1977), the Second Circuit stated that "the guidelines do not constitute impermissible *ex post facto* laws when applied to an adult offender since, in such an instance, they merely clarify the exercise of administrative discretion without altering any existing considerations for parole release." *Id.* at 654. The decision in this case has thus created a conflict among the circuits and placed in doubt the validity of Guidelines that are central to the parole process.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

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OCTOBER 1978

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 77-1679 and 77-1858

JOHN M. GERAGHTY, indiv. and on
behalf of a class,

v.

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF UNITED STATES
and
SUPERINTENDENT FEDERAL PRISON

Allenwood, Pa.

John M. Geraghty, appellant in 77-1679

Eliezer Becher, appellant in 77-1858

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

C.A. No. 76-1467

Argued October 21, 1977

Before: ADAMS and GARTH, *Circuit Judges*, and
LACEY, *District Judge*.*

* United States District Judge for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.

OPINION OF THE COURT
(Filed March 9, 1978)

ADAMS, *Circuit Judge*.

This appeal, in an action challenging the parole guidelines promulgated by the United States Parole Commission, raises two issues of broad import. First, it requires us to examine the conditions under which a class action, which the trial court refused to certify, may be submitted to an appellate court despite the fact that the named plaintiff no longer retains a "live" personal grievance. Second, it presents the question of the validity, under both statutory and constitutional standards, of the guidelines that govern federal grants of parole.

I. THE FACTS

A. *The Guidelines*

Beginning in 1910, certain prisoners incarcerated for conviction of federal crimes have been eligible for release on parole.¹ To facilitate such arrangement, the United States, in 1948, established a Parole Board (the Board), under the Department of Justice, to rule on applications for parole. While originally the Board's decisions were not based on formally articulated policies and procedures, in 1973 the Board published a series of regulations governing parole deci-

¹ The Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387 § 1, 36 Stat. 319, was the first legislation that established authority to grant parole to federal prisoners.

sions, including "guidelines" to establish "customary release dates" for given classes of offenders.²

In 1976, Congress enacted the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act (the PCRA).³ The PCRA reconstituted the Parole Board as the United States Parole Commission (the Commission), an independent federal agency. Under the PCRA, the Commission is responsible for promulgating "guidelines" for the exercise of statutory discretion concerning the granting of parole.⁴ In making a decision regarding an individual inmate, the Commission is directed to examine "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the prisoner," and then to determine whether release would "depreciate the seriousness of his offense," "promote disrespect for the law" or "jeopardize the public welfare." Inmates are to be released "pursuant to the guidelines" if the determination by the Commission, in light of the statutory criteria, is favorable.⁵

The "guidelines" currently utilized are substantially the same ones that channeled the Board's discretion before the enactment of the PCRA. Under them, offenses are assigned a "severity" rating, and

² 38 Fed. Reg. 26652-57 (Sept. 24, 1973). For an extensive analysis of the guidelines and associated issues of policy and law, see Note, *Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process*, 84 Yale L.J. 810 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note].

³ 18 U.S.C. § 4201-4218 (1976).

⁴ 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a) (1976).

⁵ 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (1976).

are placed into one of six categories, ranging from "low" to "greatest." Each inmate is assigned a "parole prognosis score" of between 0 and 11, using "salient factors" such as the age at which the inmate was first convicted, his employment background, his drug history, his previous parole revocations, and his prior convictions. The "guidelines" include a grid in which a combination of salient factor score and offense severity rating identifies a "customary" time span to be served.⁶

B. The Named Plaintiff

John M. Geraghty, a Chicago policeman, was convicted in 1973 of conspiracy to commit extortion and

⁶ The current guidelines, codified at 28 C.F.R. § 2.20, are reproduced as Appendix I, *infra*. Previous cases in this Circuit concerning the guidelines have dealt primarily with the availability of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as a vehicle for trial judges to resentencing prisoners where the expectations of the sentencing judge have been frustrated by the applications of the guidelines. *Addonizio v. United States*, Nos. 77-1542, 77-1621, 77-2373 (3d Cir. Feb. 16, 1978); *United States v. Somers*, 552 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1977); *United States v. Salerno*, 538 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir.) *aff'd per curiam sur petition for rehearing* 542 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1976); *cf. United States v. Solly*, 559 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1977) (reversing denial of Rule 35 motion where parole guidelines operated to frustrate sentencing judge's expectation). The availability of § 2255 has been a subject of some disagreement among the circuits. Compare *e.g. United States v. Kent*, 563 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1977); *United States v. McBride*, 560 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1977); *Andrino v. United States Board of Parole*, 550 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1977) with *e.g. Kortness v. United States*, 514 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1975); *United States v. Slutsky*, 514 F.2d 1222 (2d Cir. 1975).

Recently, in *United States v. Musto*, No. 77-1239 (slip op. 1978), this Court held that § 2255 was unavailable as a jurisdictional base for an attempt by one already confined to alter a sentence imposed by a judge who had knowledge of the parole guidelines. But *Musto* would not appear to alter the holding in *Zannino v. Arnold*, 531 F.2d 687, 690 (3d Cir. 1976), that judicial review of a parole board decision is available under 28 U.S.C. 2241 "to insure that the Board has followed criteria appropriate, rational and consistent with the statute and that its decision is not arbitrary and capricious nor based on impermissible considerations." See *id.* at 689 n.5.

of making false declarations to the grand jury. The extortion charge was based on Geraghty's use of his position as a Chicago Vice Squad Sergeant to shake down local dispensers of alcoholic beverages; the false declaration charge arose out of denials of involvement in this activity. After attempts to overturn his sentence proved unsuccessful,⁷ Geraghty applied for parole. Despite the good institutional adjustment one might expect from a former policeman, parole was denied Geraghty on the ground that:

Your offense has been rated as very high severity. You have a salient factor score of 11. You have been in custody for a total of 4 months. Guidelines established by the Board for adult cases which consider the above factors indicate a range of 26-36 months to be served before release for cases with good institutional program performance and adjustment. After review of all relevant factors and information presented, it is found that a decision at this consideration outside the guidelines does not appear warranted.

As finally amended, Geraghty's sentence was 30 months. Thus, under the "customary release date," he

⁷ Geraghty's conviction was affirmed in *United States v. Braasch*, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974) *cert. denied sub nom. Geraghty v. United States*, 421 U.S. 910 (1975). His sentence was subsequently reduced by the trial court from 4 years to 30 months, under Rule 35, F.R. Crim. P. The reduction was based on a finding that the guidelines would cause Geraghty to be imprisoned substantially longer than the district court intended. *United States v. Braasch*, No. 72 C.R. 979 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 1975), *mandamus denied* 542 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1976).

could not be granted parole before the end of his sentence as reduced by "good time" credits.

Geraghty applied for parole a second time, but that request was also denied in June, 1976. The second statement of reasons given by the Commission was substantially identical with the first.⁸ Asserting that he was being denied parole by reason of a mechanical application of the guidelines, Geraghty then brought the present suit as a class action challenging the validity of the guidelines, and questioning the procedures by which the guidelines were applied to his case.⁹

Judge R. Dixon Herman, of the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, declined to certify the class action, and granted summary judgment against Geraghty on all of the claims he had asserted. After an appeal from both rulings was docketed, but before oral argument was heard by us, Geraghty's sentence expired and he was released.

II. JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS

Before proceeding to the merits of Geraghty's contentions, we must consider a number of significant procedural objections.

⁸ A verbatim reproduction of this statement was upheld by a panel of this Circuit as a sufficient articulation of reasons to satisfy the demands of due process. *Hill v. Atty. Gen.*, 550 F.2d 901 (1977) accord *Garcia v. United States*, 557 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1977).

⁹ Although the action was originally filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia, the matter was transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, where Geraghty was then confined. *Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission*, Civ. No. 76-1729 (D. D.C. 1976).

A. Jurisdictional Basis of Suit

Initially, the question of the jurisdictional underpinning of the suit before us must be resolved. In his complaint, Geraghty claimed jurisdiction under (1) 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the habeas corpus statute), (2) 5 U.S.C. §§ 700-706 (the Administrative Procedure Act), and (3) 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). The trial court held that under *Preiser v. Rodriguez*,¹⁰ habeas corpus is the only remedial base available to the plaintiff. To the contrary, however, we conclude that it is appropriate to treat this action as one for declaratory judgment under 5 U.S.C. §§ 700-706 (1970) and 18 U.S.C. § 4218(c) (1976).

In *Preiser*, state prisoners brought suit seeking an injunction restoring "good time" credits that they claimed were unconstitutionally taken from them. The Supreme Court held that since the prisoners were challenging the fact or duration of their imprisonments, § 1983 was unavailable, and their sole federal remedy was by habeas corpus. The *Preiser* opinion rested on two grounds. First, the Court noted that the interest in federal-state comity weighed against the advisability of allowing state prisoners to bypass the exhaustion requirement¹¹ of the state habeas corpus statute.¹² Second, the Court stated that the more specific provisions of the habeas corpus act should be

¹⁰ 411 U.S. 475 (1973).

¹¹ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970).

¹² 411 U.S. at 490-92.

read to modify the general cause of action granted by § 1983.¹³

Neither of these considerations is applicable here. The courts face no barriers resulting from federal-state relations in adjudicating issues such as the ones before us, since the present controversy involves the application of a federal statute by federal authorities. And, unlike a habeas corpus action challenging state confinements, no exhaustion has been statutorily mandated. Indeed, in contrast to the situation, in *Preiser*, Congress expressly contemplated declaratory actions to challenge the provisions of the federal parole guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 4218(c) (1976) declares that Parole Commission actions, except for individual parole decisions, are to be reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act.¹⁴ The legislative history of § 4218(c) states, *inter alia*:

This section brings the Commission rule-making process within the coverage of the Administrative Procedure Act judicial review procedures. In this regard, the Conferees recognize the principles established in *Pickus v. United States*, 507 F.2d 1107 (1974).¹⁵

¹³ 411 U.S. at 489-90.

¹⁴ 18 U.S.C. § 4218 became effective May 15, 1976. The suit in this case was filed in September of 1976.

¹⁵ House Conf. Rep. No. 94-838 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. 36 reprinted 1976 U.S. Code, Cong. & Ad. News 351, 368. [hereinafter cited as Conference Report]

Pickus v. Parole Board,¹⁶ entailed a challenge by prisoners to parole guidelines brought as an action for declaratory judgment under the APA. It appears that Congress in citing *Pickus* clearly evinced an intent to allow suits like the one before us to proceed by way of an action for declaratory judgment.¹⁷

Moreover, even under the strictures of *Preiser*, itself, the present action would not be inexorably channeled into the form of a habeas corpus proceeding. While the relief requested for Geraghty included "enlargement from custody" pending review of his parole status, such request is now moot. In comparison, the class relief sought was (a) a declaration that the parole guidelines are invalid, and (b) an injunction against further actions denying parole to other federal prisoners on the basis of the guidelines. This relief falls within the Supreme Court's holding in *Wolff v. McDonnell*, 418 U.S. 539, 554-55 (1974), that *Preiser* does not bar either a declaratory judgment or a prospective injunction against enforcement of unconstitutional regulations relating to revocation of good time credits. The class does not demand that its members be released on parole, but only that the Parole Board not utilize the guidelines in evaluating future parole applications.

¹⁶ 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

¹⁷ This expression of intent by Congress renders inapplicable the Supreme Court's decision in *Califano v. Sanders*, 45 USLW 4209 (1977). *Califano* held that as a matter of statutory construction, the APA does not confer jurisdiction on federal courts, absent other statutory authorization.

Therefore we conclude that this suit may proceed as an action for declaratory judgment.¹⁸

B. Mootness

We are next faced with a challenge to this Court's jurisdiction on the basis of mootness. After the appeal was filed, but prior to oral argument, Geraghty was released from confinement. Since, at trial, Judge Herman declined to certify this case as a class action, the government contends that the matter is now moot because of Geraghty's release. The argument proceeds that Geraghty, as the named plaintiff, has no further stake in the operation of the parole guidelines, and no class, in fact, has been certified to assert an interest in the guidelines.¹⁹

Geraghty makes two responses to the claim of mootness. First, he declares that challenges to the parole guidelines represent a situation where a legal injury is "capable of repetition yet evading review." Prisoners

¹⁸ *Bijeol v. Benson*, 513 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1975) and *Biliteri v. U.S. Parole Bd.*, 541 F.2d 938, 947-48 (2d Cir. 1976), may appear to be at odds with our decision. The Court in *Bijeol*, however, did not have before it the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 2418. And in *Biliteri* the plaintiff requested neither declaratory nor prospective injunctive relief, and did not challenge the propriety of the guidelines.

This Court's holding in *Marerro v. Warden*, 483 F.2d 656, 659-60 (3d Cir. 1973), *rev'd on other grounds* 417 U.S. 653 (1974), that habeas corpus may be used to attack a denial of parole does not undermine our result, for we in no way intimated in *Marerro* that habeas corpus was the sole route available. Cf. *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973) (habeas and § 1983 are alternative remedies with respect to prison conditions).

¹⁹ See *Board of School Commissioners of Indianapolis v. Jacobs*, 420 U.S. 128 (1975); *Weinstein v. Bradford*, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); *Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler*, 427 U.S. 424, 430 (1976).

will often be released before their cases are finally resolved in the appellate courts. Therefore, he avers, the case before us comes within a traditional exception to the mootness doctrine.²⁰ Second, Geraghty maintains that his case is encompassed by the principle that a class action is not moot simply because the claims of the named plaintiff are rendered academic. He urges that the failure of Judge Herman to grant class action status was an abuse of discretion and that subsequently granted class status should be permitted to "relate back" to the time when Geraghty had a live claim.²¹

Resolution of the justiciability of this case in light of the mootness objection is best undertaken in the context of a somewhat extended discussion of this evolving doctrine.²²

²⁰ See, e.g. *Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle*, 416 U.S. 115 (1974); *United States v. New York Telephone Co.*, 46 U.S.L.W. 4033, 4035 n.6 (1977); *United States v. Frumento*, 552 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc).

²¹ See, e.g. *Gerstein v. Pugh*, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975); *Williams v. Wohlgenuth*, 540 F.2d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 1976).

The plaintiff also presses the application of Eliezer Becher to intervene as a named plaintiff. Becher, like Geraghty, has been an inmate of Lewisburg who had been denied parole. Unlike Geraghty, however, Becher had not been released at the time his motion to intervene was argued before this Court. Becher's motion was originally presented after the appeal to this Court had been docketed, and the district court divested of jurisdiction. His request to intervene was therefore denied. Since we conclude that the case must be remanded to the district court for other determinations, it is also appropriate that Becher's motion to intervene be remanded for a determination as to the reasons for his failure to intervene earlier, and an examination of the potential prejudice, if any, which might result from such intervention. See *Pennsylvania v. Rizzo*, 530 F.2d 501 (3d Cir.) cert. denied 426 U.S. 921 (1976). Cf. *United Air Lines v. McDonald*, 45 USLW 4760 (1977).

²² The development of the principles governing mootness and their interaction with the emergence of class actions has been the subject of a considerable number of recent scholarly discussions. See H. Newberg, *Newberg on Class*

1. *Contours of Mootness Doctrine*

The principle that a court may not decide a moot case arose primarily from rules of equity and common law, as well as from traditional notions of the functions of courts.²³ It was only in the last decade that the attitude of the Supreme Court toward the adjudication of moot cases became definitively intertwined with the mandate of Article III, which provides that the power of the judiciary is limited to cases or controversies.²⁴

Still more recently, however, the Supreme Court has made clear that elements of the "mootness" doctrine find their roots not only in constitutional dictates, but also in more flexible considerations of pol-

22. (Cont'd.)

Actions §§ 1085-1092 (1977); Kane, *Standing, Mootness and Federal Rule 24—Balancing Perspectives*, 26 Buffalo L. Rev. 83 (1976); *Developments in the Law—Class Actions*, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1163-71 (1976); Comment, *Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative*, 1974 Duke L.J. 573; *The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court*, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373 (1974); Note, *Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court*, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1672 (1970); Note, *A Search for Principles of Mootness in the Federal Courts, Part One, the Continuing Impact Doctrine*, 54 Texas L. Rev. 1289 (1976); *Part Two, Class Actions id.* 1310.

²³ See Note, *The Mootness Doctrine*, *supra* note 22, 373 and 374-75 nn.9-11 (1974); Note, *Mootness on Appeal*, *supra* note 22, at 1672, 1673-74 n.12 (and authorities cited therein).

²⁴ U.S. Const. Art. III § 2. The first mootness holding explicitly couched in terms of Art. III jurisdictional limitations was *Sibron v. New York*, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968), although the Court had referred to Art. III limitations in *Liner v. Jafco*, 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964) and *Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth*, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937). See Note, *Mootness Doctrine*, *supra* note 22, at 375, Note, *Mootness on Appeal*, *supra* note 22 at 1673-74; cf. G. Gunther, *Constitutional Law* 1578-80 (9th Ed. 1975) (evidencing skepticism about recent assertion of constitutional origins of mootness doctrine).

icy.²⁵ The first step in our mootness analysis, therefore, must be to attempt to etch the outlines of the constitutional elements of this doctrine.

The constitutional command that matters submitted to the judiciary for resolution must be within the category of "case or controversy"

limits the business of the federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context, and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.²⁶

As we understand the constitutional requirements, a case presented for adjudication must be an actual, concrete dispute over legal rights; the controversy may not be a hypothetical one.²⁷ In addition, at the commencement of suit, the dispute must concern some

²⁵ *Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.*, 424 U.S. 747, 755-57 and n.8 (1976) (for a unanimous court on this point); *Kremens v. Bartley*, 45 U.S.L.W. 4451, 4453, 4454 (1977). See Kane, *supra* note 22, at 84-88, 94.

²⁶ *Flast v. Cohen*, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968), quoted in *Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.*, 424 U.S. 747, 755 (1976). See e.g. Note, *Mootness Doctrine*, *supra* note 22 at 376-377.

²⁷ The judgment of a federal court must resolve "a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." *Preiser v. Newkirk*, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975), quoting *North Carolina v. Rice*, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971), quoting *Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth*, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937).

individual plaintiff who is injured by the wrong in question.²⁸

However, once a suit meeting these conditions has been instituted, the limitations of Article III do not absolutely require that an individual who is personally harmed by the wrongs continue to have a live dispute. Rather, the issues with regard to jurisdiction are:

- (1) Whether a legal controversy exists sufficient to establish that the case is not hypothetical.
- (2) Whether the controversy affects an individual in a concrete case sufficient to provide the factual predicate for the reasoned adjudication which is the province of the judiciary.
- (3) In addition, the court must answer the more policy-oriented question whether the parties before it have, at the time for decision, sufficient functional adversity to sharpen the issues for judicial resolution.

The existence of a plaintiff with standing at the outset of the litigation insures the initial fulfillment of these three conditions; but the elimination of the individual grievance may bring such fulfillment into question. Once suit has been commenced, it nonetheless remains open to the court to determine that a case or controversy persists despite the disappearance of

²⁸ See, e.g. *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 498-501 (1975).

the named plaintiff as a "live" litigant.²⁹ Moreover, since the third consideration is not an absolute Article III requirement, in evaluating the degree of functional adversity, the court may ascribe weight to reasons of policy.³⁰

We reach these conclusions on the basis not only of the Supreme Court's explications of the mootness doctrine, but in reliance on cases in which the Supreme Court has actually exercised jurisdiction.

2. *Actions Surviving Loss of Claim by the Named Plaintiff*

(a) *Repetitious Evasion of Review*

The first genre of disputes in which the Supreme Court has not required a continuing live stake was described by our Court in *United States v. Frumento* as the "most traditional of exceptions to the mootness doctrine."³¹ This group of cases has utilized the rubric "capable of repetition yet evading review" to characterize controversies whose effect on plaintiffs is,

²⁹ See Kane, *supra* note 22 at 84-85, 94-96 (two part test exists: actual injury and controversy and discretionary determination), Note, *Mootness Doctrine*, *supra* note 22 at 389, 394-95 (discretion should look to impact of a decision on the merits on the necessity for future litigation. The amenability of a fact pattern to definitive resolution would imply that future litigation might be minimized by taking jurisdiction).

³⁰ See Note, *Developments in the Law—Class Actions*, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1364-66, (1977) (Supreme Court has moved from the focus on continuing controversy with named plaintiff to an inquiry into the status of legal issues in dispute between the class and the class adversary); Note, *Mootness Doctrine*, *supra* note 22 at 388-395 (non-mootness may be predicated upon existence of injury to class).

³¹ 552 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc).

by their very nature, of limited duration. In such instances it is unlikely that any person will retain a live stake in the outcome of the case by the time it has made its way through the appellate process. Nonetheless, the actions complained of are likely to be repeated, and therefore present the possibility of a recurring but a judicially irremediable wrong unless jurisdiction is retained.³²

In many of these cases, the party who originally brought suit can present a plausible argument that he or she will be subject to a recurrence of the conduct at issue, and accordingly continues to have a personal stake in the controversy. To this extent, the plaintiff retains a "live" interest. Such hypothesis, however, in many cases would clearly fail to meet the standards imposed on litigants at the outset of a case to show "standing,"³³ and in others seem to be keyed

³² *E.g. Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC*, 219 U.S. 498 (1911) (regulatory order effective for two years); *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (gestation period as limit to impact of abortion law); *Sosna v. Iowa*, 419 U.S. 393 (1976) (one year residency requirement for divorcees); *Dunn v. Blumstein*, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (one year residency period for eligibility to vote); *Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart*, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) ("gag order" limited to duration of trial); *Super Tire Engineering Corp. v. McCorkle*, 416 U.S. 115, 125-27 (1974) (welfare benefits to striking workers); *United States v. New York Telephone Co.*, 46 USLW 4033, 4035 n.6 (Dec. 1977) ("pen register" order of limited duration). *Gerstein v. Pugh*, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (pretrial detention). See Note, *Mootness Doctrine*, *supra* note 22 at 383-388, *Singleton v. Wulff*, 428 U.S. 106, 117 (1976) (dictum).

Cf. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 (1975) (challenge to prison disciplinary procedure moot where punishment of named plaintiff under procedure had ceased, no class action had been alleged, and plaintiff could have no "reasonable expectation of repetition" of the procedure in question).

³³ Compare *e.g. United States v. New York Telephone Co.*, 46 U.S.L.W. 4033 (1977); *Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stewart*, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); *Super*

to the notion that the conduct at issue may be repeated with respect to someone within the class represented, although not with respect to the particular named plaintiff.³⁴

If the disputed action will, with reasonable probability, recur in the near future and the issues may be resolved without reference to nuances of particular fact situations, the constitutional prerequisites of a legal controversy and a concrete factual predicate may be satisfied despite the lack of a named plaintiff before the court who retains his original interest in the conflict. The potential for repetition with respect to such plaintiff may itself be one indication of the satisfaction of the further prudential criterion of functional adversity, but the unfairness of an evasion of review may also be relevant to the exercise of discretion. Repetition is not, however, the sole possible indication of either constitutional or discretionary justiciability.

(b) Class Actions

In the related area of the mootness of class actions, the Supreme Court has consistently held that once a

33. (Cont'd.)

Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115 (1974) with *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); *Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Ass.*, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).

³⁴ See *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (other pregnant women denied abortion, even after plaintiff's term of pregnancy); *Sosna v. Iowa*, 419 U.S. 393, 399-403 (1975) (1 year residency requirement for divorce, applicable to other potential divorcees); *Dunn v. Blumstein*, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (1 year voter residency requirement applicable to others who move into the voting district).

class action is certified, the mooting of a claim set forth by the named plaintiff does not automatically deprive a court of jurisdiction over the cause of action asserted by the class. A justiciable legal controversy may continue to exist between the class as an entity and the defendant, thus satisfying Article III. Originally, this holding was articulated in the context of class actions dealing with claims that were also capable of repetition but evading review.³⁵

But the Supreme Court has, in other situations, sustained the justiciability of what may be referred to as "headless" class actions; that is class actions in which the named plaintiff retains no "live" claim. In *Richardson v. Ramirez*,³⁶ the Court adjudicated the complaint of a class composed of California ex-prisoners, despite the fact that three named plaintiffs already had obtained the relief they sought. The action challenged the denial of voting rights to ex-felons under California law. By the time the case reached the appellate court, however, the three named ex-felons had already been registered to vote by the named defendants, three county clerks charged with enforcing election statutes. Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court issued a declaratory judgment.

On review, the Supreme Court noted that inasmuch as the opinion of the California tribunal was binding

³⁵ *Gerstein v. Pugh*, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); *Sosa v. Iowa*, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); *Dunn v. Blumstein*, 405 U.S. 830 (1972).

³⁶ 418 U.S. 24 (1974).

on all county clerks, the underlying issue evaded review by being "incapable of repetition."³⁷ In addition, since the Court interpreted the case as an action against a class composed of all county clerks, it identified a "live" controversy between the non-consenting clerks and felons who, in the future, might wish to register in their districts. Although it is clear that the named plaintiffs could not have commenced suit simply by claiming that they wished to move to the other counties and register to vote,³⁸ once suit was appropriately instituted, the Supreme Court took notice of an on-going controversy with unnamed class members.

More recently, in *Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.*,³⁹ an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme Court acknowledged the viability of a headless class action, where the lone named plaintiff had lost his eligibility for relief as a result of subsequent misconduct. Inasmuch as the plaintiff class had been properly certified, the Court held that a continuing legal controversy was clear, and the case was not constitutionally moot. The Court also attributed the earlier linkage of headless class actions to situations capable of repetition but evading review to "policy rules" rather than to the constitu-

³⁷ 418 U.S. at 35.

³⁸ See *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 514-517 (1975).

³⁹ 424 U.S. 747 (1976).

tional element of justiciability.⁴⁰ Identifying a situation repetitiously evading review was only one method of establishing sufficient "functional adversity," the Court held. In *Bowman* the class certification combined with the factors that the class members were easily identifiable, clearly entitled to a remedy, and had demonstrated competence and tenacity in their litigation subsequent to the disqualification of the class representative, satisfied the requirements of the mootness doctrine.⁴¹

From the *Ramirez* and *Bowman* cases, plus the class-oriented "repetition" cases, we draw the conclusion that a continuing conflict between a clearly-defined class and a defendant remains an Article III case or controversy even after the named plaintiff loses his personal stake in the outcome. And, if the evidence indicates a possibility of evasion of review, or a clear continuing functional adversity, the discretionary component of the mootness doctrine is also satisfied.

Thus, in the case before us, if Geraghty's suit had been properly certified as a class action before he had

⁴⁰ 424 U.S. at 756 n.8. See 424 U.S. at 781 (opinion of Powell, J. joined by Rehnquist, J. concurring on this point).

⁴¹ 424 U.S. at 756-57. In contrast, in *E. Texas Motor Freight Systems, Inc. v. Rodriguez*, 45 U.S.L.W. 4524 (1977), where the plaintiff had never been a part of the class which he sought to represent, it was held that the class was improperly certified on appeal. Cf. *Kremens v. Bartley*, 45 U.S.L.W. 4451 (1977), where the Supreme Court held that changes in law so fragmented the interest of the plaintiff class that it could no longer clearly identify a common interest.

been released from prison, it would have been jurisdictionally appropriate to continue to entertain the suit even after his release. Obviously, a large number of prisoners remain subject to the parole guidelines, and insofar as the guidelines result in their being denied parole, such prisoners clearly are adversely affected. In adjudicating this matter, a court therefore would not be concerned merely with an abstract or hypothetical conflict. And a proper class certification would bring into focus the "functional adversity" necessary for adjudication.

3. *The Impact of Denial of Class Certification*

In this case the trial court refused class certification. The question, then, is whether such refusal combined with Geraghty's release prevents our review of this matter, on the ground that we have before us neither a "live" plaintiff nor a properly certified class.

The Parole Commission earnestly contends that under *Board of School Commissioners of Indianapolis v. Jacobs*,⁴² in the absence of a properly certified class the mooting of a named plaintiff automatically removes the suit from the category of a justiciable case or controversy. Reading *Jacobs* in this fashion, however, is incompatible with the Supreme Court's holdings in both prior and subsequent cases.⁴³

⁴² 420 U.S. 128 (1975).

⁴³ The statements in *Sosna*, *Franks*, *Gerstein*, and *East Texas* that justiciability remains "given a properly certified class" may simply point to *certifiability*, not actual certification, as the crucial question. See *Satterwhite*

In *Gerstein v. Pugh*,⁴³ the short duration of challenged pretrial custody precluded a class from being certified before the named plaintiffs were released. Nevertheless, the district court certified a class of pretrial detainees, and entertained the action. Noting that the challenged procedures would continue to apply to a succession of pretrial detainees, the Supreme Court held that the class certification preserved justiciability even though the certification might have been entered after the named plaintiffs lost a "live" interest in the suit.⁴⁵

43. (Cont'd.)

v. City of Greenville, 557 F.2d 414, 417-421 (5th Cir. 1977) rehearing *en banc* granted; *Frost v. Weinberger*, 515 F.2d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J) (*Sosna's* insistence on continuing existence of individual claim until certification is "drained" by "relation back" doctrine). Similarly, *Weinstein v. Bradford*, 423 U.S. 127 (1975), which dismissed a parole challenge as moot, is inapposite here since the *Weinstein* plaintiffs did not appeal the denial of class certification. *Cf. Scott v. Kentucky Parole Board*, 429 U.S. 60 (1976) (individual action, no attempt to certify class).

⁴⁴ 420 U.S. 103 (1975).

⁴⁵ The stated rationale, that the later certification "related back" to the time that the plaintiffs had claims is at best a legal fiction. *See Gardner v. Westinghouse*, (Seitz, J. concurring) No. 76-1410 (3d Cir. 1977) slip op. at 18-19, cert. granted — U.S. —; *Frost v. Weinberger*, 515 F.2d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 1975).

The *Gerstein* decision had been presaged by *Kelly v. Wyman*, 294 F. Supp. 887, 890 (S.D. N.Y. 1968) *aff'd sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254, 256 n.2 (1970). There the district court refused to dismiss a challenge to welfare regulations before class certification despite an allegation that most if not all of the named plaintiffs had been reinstated to welfare, on the ground that "plaintiffs claim to represent a class." The Supreme Court affirmed the class relief, noting that some of the then-named plaintiffs were still embroiled in disputes with the welfare department. It was not clear, however, whether those plaintiffs had been named at the time of the original decision or had subsequently intervened. *See Goosby v. Osser*, 409 U.S. 512 (1973) (adjudicating class action of prisoners confined to pretrial detention, despite the fact

The Supreme Court in *Baxter v. Palmigiano*⁴⁶ adjudicated a controversy concerning prison regulations, although the case had not been properly certified as a class action and the named plaintiffs had died or had been released prior to the oral argument on appeal. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent intervention of another prisoner brought a justiciable case before the Court. This was so despite the fact that it was not clear that when the intervention had occurred, the district court still had a "live" individual plaintiff before it.

Most recently, in *United Airlines v. McDonald*,⁴⁷ the Supreme Court reviewed a refusal to allow putative class members in an employment discrimination suit to intervene in order to appeal a denial of class certification. By the time the motion for intervention was presented, the original named plaintiffs had already been awarded relief and as to them the case was moot. Again, intervention was permitted at a time

45. (Cont'd.)

that apparently there was no indication whether they had been released prior to class certification); *Conover v. Montemuro*, 477 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1973) (*en banc*) (allowing class action on behalf of juvenile detainees, despite the fact that named detainees had been released after short time).

Since *Gerstein* a number of courts have allowed certification on a "relating back" theory. *E.g. Williams v. Wohlgenmuth*, 540 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1976); *Basel v. Knebel*, 551 F.2d 395, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1977); *Zurak v. Regan*, 550 F.2d 86 cert. denied — U.S. — (2d Cir. 1977).

⁴⁶ 425 U.S. 308, 311 n.1 (1976).

⁴⁷ 45 U.S.L.W. 4760 (1977). *Cf. Haas v. Pittsburgh National Bank*, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975) (allowing substitute plaintiff to intervene for named plaintiff who never had standing, but allowing filing of original class action to toll statute of limitations).

when the named plaintiffs no longer retained "live" claims.

In light of *Gerstein*, handed down on the same day as *Jacobs*, and of *Baxter* and *McDonald*, both decided after *Jacobs*, the *Jacobs* case should not be viewed as standing for the proposition that the federal courts are constitutionally barred from continuing to adjudicate disputes when the named plaintiff no longer retains his claim. So long as a factually concrete legal controversy continues to exist, it would appear that the constitutional power of a court over the case remains. Consequently, the holding of *Jacobs* is perhaps best understood as a specific instance that must be seen in the context of the over-arching set of principles adumbrated by the authorities cited above.

In *Jacobs*, the Supreme Court reviewed a First Amendment challenge by a group of students to regulations limiting publication of a newspaper. Since the students had graduated, and the periodical in question had ceased publication, the inability to delimit accurately the plaintiff class deprived the Court of the assurance of justiciability. In addition, the failure of counsel to seek a proper class certification cast serious doubt on the continued adequacy of the adversarial clash.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ As other courts have noted, the failure to certify the class in *Jacobs* was not assigned as error. *Napier v. Gertrude*, 542 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1976) cert. denied — U.S. — (1977); *Gardner v. Westinghouse*, No. 76-1410 (3d Cir. 1977) slip op. at 18 n.5 (Seitz, J. concurring) cert. granted — U.S. —.

An appropriately defined and certified class assures the courts that the case involves a concrete legal controversy, proper factual predicate, and functional adversity. The lack of certification, however, does not inevitably require dismissal, if the elements of justiciability are otherwise established.⁴⁹ Thus, in *Gerstein*, *Baxter*, and *McDonald* no doubt could validly have been raised concerning the continuation of the underlying legal controversies. Counsel in *Gerstein* and *McDonald*, could not have been charged with responsibility for the failure of certification, and in both *Baxter* and *McDonald* the continuation of the adversarial difference was assured by the intervention of live plaintiffs. In those situations, a concrete dispute continued and representation was adequate. Consequently, the cases were not dismissed.

⁴⁹ We acknowledge that the courts of appeals are divided on the question of whether under the recent Supreme Court decisions, the denial of class action status is appealable by a named plaintiff whose claim has become moot. *Banks v. Multi Family Management*, 554 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1977) (Refusal to certify since development of mootness was not "inherent in the nature of the claims," and the named defendant had already agreed to relief sought); *Satterwhite v. City of Greenville*, 557 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1977) rehearing granted en banc (refusal to certify class is appealable if improper if at the time that the class should have been certified, and the named plaintiff still had a live claim at that time); *Kuahulu v. Employers Insurance of Wausau*, 557 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977) (survival of action is governed by "idiosyncracies of each case;" action in question did not survive, but the Court suggests a number of situations in which it might); *Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings and Loan*, 560 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1977) (damages claimed were tendered to individuals, non-plausible claim of repetition, no review allowed of failure to certify class. Dictum that issue of class certification cannot survive mootness of individual claim); *Napier v. Gertrude*, 542 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1976) (review available where failure to certify is "correctable on appeal," correctability is a function of particular situations, mainly available in situations otherwise evading review).

In the matter before us, there is neither a contention by the government nor evidence in the record which raises any question but that a legal controversy exists. The fate of numerous federal prisoners continues to turn in large part on the application of the guidelines in question. Such a situation in our view satisfies the "case or controversy" components of the mootness doctrine. Further, under the circumstances of this case, the more discretionary elements of the restrictions against entertaining moot cases do not mandate dismissal. Four aspects of the case lead to this conclusion.

First, Geraghty's action, while not wholly congruent, shares many characteristics with the cases denominated "capable of repetition, yet evading review." This is so since federal prisoners are eligible for parole if their sentences exceed one year.⁵⁰ Accordingly, while some prisoners will retain their grievances long enough to achieve appellate review, a number of prisoners with short sentences, like Geraghty, will inevitably be discharged before they have an opportunity to litigate fully the legality of the rules which deny them parole. This alone is a factor weighing heavily in favor of justiciability.⁵¹ And since it is the prisoners with unusually short sentences to whom the parole

⁵⁰ 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1976).

⁵¹ See *Zurak v. Regan*, 550 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1977) (prisoners whose complaints on parole procedure would often—but not always—evade review were allowed to "relate back" certification to a time before the named plaintiff's release). Cf. *United States v. Frumento*, 552 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1977) (*en banc*) (compulsion to testify before grand jury).

guidelines deny the benefit of the trial judge's leniency,⁵² the limited probability of review for a prisoner with a short sentence is particularly pertinent.

Second, as we have noted, this case involves denial of a class action certification. As Chief Judge Seitz observed in *Gardner v. Westinghouse*,⁵³ if mooting of a named plaintiff's claim bars review of a denial of class certification our rule against interlocutory appeals of class certification orders will, in a significant number of cases, effectively immunize from review such adverse class determinations. This is hardly a salutary result for, although class certification had been improperly denied, a constitutionally justiciable controversy nevertheless continues to exist.

Third, the attorneys for Geraghty, while not possessed of a legally continuing relationship with members of the plaintiff class,⁵⁴ have nonetheless undertaken this litigation on a class-oriented basis. There is no indication of any diminution of vigor in their efforts despite the release of Geraghty. Indeed, as already observed, they represent another individual plaintiff who now seeks to intervene in the matter. Consequently, there is a *prima facie* case of functional adversity, a central element which the mootness doctrine seeks to preserve.

⁵² The government's brief in this action (p. 12) suggests that only prisoners with short sentences have an interest in attacking the guidelines' failure to take account of sentence length.

⁵³ Slip op. No. 76-1410 (3d Cir. 1977) (Seitz, C.J. concurring), *cert. granted* — U.S. —.

⁵⁴ Cf. *Gerstein v. Pugh*, 420 U.S. 103, 110, 111 n.11 (1975) (public defender had continuous relationship with class of pretrial detainees).

Finally, the major issues in the case in no way appear to be tied to the nuances of individual fact patterns. The discharge of Geraghty does not alter either the interests of the members of the putative class⁵⁵ or the practice of the Parole Commission in applying its guidelines.⁵⁶

Hence, if class certification is appropriate in this case, the mootness of Geraghty's claim should not bar adjudication.

C. Trial Court's Refusal to Certify Class Action Status

Class certification was denied by the district court as neither "necessary nor appropriate."⁵⁷ It was not necessary, Judge Herman held, because the possibility of avoiding mootness is not expressly comprehended in the criteria of Rule 23. We agree with the trial court that a possibility of avoiding mootness on appeal would not, of itself, be a sufficient basis for conferring class action status on a suit otherwise barred by Rule 23. Rule 23, however, allows litigants to bring class actions so long as they meet its standards. The plaintiff here need not have proved that certification was "necessary," as the trial judge seemed to indicate, but only that there was compliance with the prerequisites of Rule 23.

⁵⁵ Cf. *Kremens v. Bartley*, 431 U.S. 119 (1977).

⁵⁶ See Note, *Mootness Doctrine*, *supra* note 22 at 394. Cf. *De Funis v. Odegar*, 416 U.S. 312 (1975).

⁵⁷ A. 46.

Judge Herman stated that the class action was not "appropriate" on a number of grounds. First, he correctly held that two of the issues raised—namely, the classification of Geraghty's offense under the guidelines and Geraghty's access to certain Commission files—had no class-wide applicability. Second, the trial judge held that since the challenge to the guidelines based on the conflict with the statute under which Geraghty was sentenced,⁵⁸ "is inapplicable to all members of the proposed class," class certification as to all prisoners was inappropriate. Finally, the court noted that while the guidelines had the effect of lengthening Geraghtys' incarceration, they would also have the effect of shortening the length of confinement of individuals who had been sentenced to terms greater than three times the period recommended by the guidelines. Thus, the court concluded, Geraghty's claims were not typical of the class he purported to represent.⁵⁹

The trial judge is correct in his observation that not all of the grounds of action alleged in the complaint are applicable to the class of "all federal prisoners who have been or will become eligible for release on parole."⁶⁰ The conclusion that this implies that a class

⁵⁸ 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (1970).

⁵⁹ Judge Herman also held that the district court's habeas corpus jurisdiction did not extend to members of the class located outside of the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Since we hold that jurisdiction lies to consider this action as one for declaratory judgment, we need not reach this question.

⁶⁰ Complaint, ¶ 5(a)(A2).

action is inappropriate, however, does not properly acknowledge the powers and duties of the trial court under section (c)(4) of Rule 23.⁶¹ Under section (c)(4), the trial judge has the power to certify certain issues as subject to class adjudication, and to limit overbroad classes by the use of sub-classes. Indeed, this authority may be exercised *sua sponte*.⁶²

Failure to exercise such power in a proper case has been held to be an abuse of discretion. In *Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh*,⁶³ for example, we concluded that the trial court's decision to decertify a class because of the administrative difficulty of computing damages was an abuse of discretion. If managerial difficulties were present, we held, "some investigation into the possible usefulness of subclasses, as sug-

⁶¹ Section 23(c)(4) reads: "When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly."

⁶² See, e.g. *Brown v. United States*, 508 F.2d 618, 627 (3rd Cir. 1975) (affirming limitation of class in part) *cert. denied* 422 U.S. 1027 (1975); *Swarb v. Lennox*, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1098-99 (1970 E.D. Pa.) (three-judge court, limiting class *sua sponte*) *aff'd in part*, 405 U.S. 191 (1972); *C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure* § 1759 p. 575-76 ("... if the plaintiff's definition of the class is found to be unacceptable, the court may construe the complaint or redefine the class to bring it within the scope of Rule 23"); *Id.* at § 1790; *Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin*, 417 U.S. 156, 179-186 (Douglas, J. concurring and dissenting); *AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe*, 407 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (redefining class). Note, *Developments in the Law*, *supra* note 22 at 1479-93 (discussing possibilities of sub-classing and class redefinition).

⁶³ 538 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1976).

gested by Rule 24(c)(4)(B), should have been undertaken before decertification was ordered."⁶⁴

Consequently, the district court need not have refused class certification *in toto* because certain claims were inapplicable to the entire class. Rather, with respect to those claims, it could have certified the class as to the prisoners to whom the claims applied. It was completely open to the trial judge to refuse certification with respect to the claims personal to Geraghty (access to files and offense severity classification), but then to certify claims relating to 18 U.S.C. 4208(a) (1970) only as to prisoners sentenced under that statute, and to certify the broader statutory and constitutional claims as to the entire prisoner class. A forbearance to consider these options constituted a failure properly to exercise discretion.

Similarly, the refusal to certify entirely because of potential inconsistencies between Geraghty's interest and those of other members of the putative class was improper in this case. First, it is not clear that a divergence in interest exists. It is true that prisoners who have been released under the guidelines have no legal interest in challenging the guidelines. Since, how-

⁶⁴ 538 F.2d at 996. See *Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.*, 561 F.2d 434, 453 (3d Cir. 1977) *cert. denied* U.S. ("even assuming that the court were correct in its conclusion that the lease claim is not appropriate for class determination, it nevertheless should have considered certification of the trademark claim under Rule 24(c)(4)(a)"); *Wright & Miller, supra* note 62 at § 1790, p. 185-87. ("Rule 23(c)(4) imposes a duty on the court and gives it ample power... it is not bound by the plaintiff's complaint and should not dismiss the action simply because it misdefines the class or issues when the court can correct the situation under 23 (c)(4)"). *Newberg, Class Actions, supra* note 22 at § 1120h (if conflicting interests can be protected by sub-classification, conflict should not preclude class action).

ever, invalidation of the guidelines would not nullify their paroles, they have no interest adverse to the plaintiffs.

On the other hand, it could be argued that prisoners whose parole dates have been scheduled, under the guidelines, for the future have an interest in maintaining the assurance provided by their presumptive parole dates. However, for prisoners like Geraghty, whose "customary release dates" fall beyond the length of time for which they are imprisoned, the guidelines are of no possible benefit. Within this last subclass, at least, there is no incompatibility of interest. By not considering the use of Rule 24(c)(4) to establish a subclass, the court did not exercise an informed discretion and therefore its action cannot be sustained.⁶⁵

Accordingly, we reverse the denial of class certification. However, since it is appropriate that the district court make the initial evaluation of the proper subclasses, the case should be remanded on this point.⁶⁶

III. THE VALIDITY OF THE GUIDELINES

A remand for resolution of the class certification dispute would improvidently dissipate judicial effort

⁶⁵ Cf. *Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.*, 508 F.2d 239, 253 (3d Cir. 1975) (subclassification "is required where the class includes subclasses with divergent interests, or where certain representatives adequately represent only one group and other representatives represent another group.") *cert. denied* 421 U.S. 1011 (1975).

⁶⁶ In addition to determining the proper boundaries of the subclasses in this case, the district court must ascertain whether the other prerequisites of class certification have been met. It may also wish to seek *amici curiae* to represent divergent interests of subclasses.

if the district court were correct in its determination that Geraghty's substantive contentions are devoid of merit. Thus, it is fitting, and indeed necessary, for us to consider the merits of Geraghty's claim regarding the guidelines.

Geraghty offers three major challenges to the validity of the guidelines: (1) the guidelines' "fixed and mechanical" approach violates both the PCRA and the Constitution; (2) the guidelines transgress both statutory and constitutional commands insofar as they fail to take account of the sentences imposed by the district courts; and (3) as applied to prisoners sentenced before their adoption, the guidelines constitute impermissible *ex post facto* legislation.⁶⁷

A. The PCRA and the Guidelines

The first two contentions require analysis of the statutory scheme of the PCRA. Since this is true, and since the government maintains that the PCRA specifically ratified the practices in question, we shall analyze the propriety of the alleged "fixed" and "mechanical" nature of the guidelines together with their alleged disregard of judicially imposed sentences.

⁶⁷ While the *ex post facto* contention was not pressed strongly on appeal, it formed a central element of the complaint and the district court's opinion. Moreover, challenges on appeal to the "retroactive" effect of PCRA (plaintiff's brief p. 57) seem to be rooted in the *ex post facto* prohibition.

Geraghty also alleges that the guidelines conflict with the Congressional intent underlying 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (1970). If we determine that the guidelines are consistent with the Congressional intent in adopting the PCRA, this objection is substantially undercut, for the PCRA reenacts and recodifies the provisions of § 4208(a)(2) as 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) (1976). Insofar as this is a change in the law, it can be analyzed under the discussion of the *ex post facto* objections.

1. The Characteristics of The Guidelines

Before beginning our exploration of the PCRA, we outline the features of the guidelines to which Geraghty objects. According to Geraghty, the guidelines find their origin in decisions by the Parole Board to categorize a series of 51 "offenses" into six severity levels,—low, low moderate, moderate, high, very high, and greatest—without regard to the actual sentences imposed for each offense.⁶⁸ For the various severity levels, the median length of time served by prisoners in each of three "prognosis categories"⁶⁹ became the three "customary release dates" for that level. While admitting that in fixing severity levels it essentially followed the procedure which Geraghty outlined, the Commission denies that the median incarceration formed the basis of the "customary release date." Geraghty's proof is sufficient to raise a material issue of fact as to the method by which the "customary release date" is calculated by the Commission.

Geraghty alleges that, after the Commission has set its grid of "customary release dates," such release dates predetermine the time when prisoners will be paroled without regard to the individual facts of each case. This assertion is given substance by the Com-

⁶⁸ The "offenses" do not necessarily involve violations of different statutes. For example, income tax evasion (less than \$10,000) is a different "offense" from income tax evasion (\$10,000-50,000). Likewise, possession with intent to distribute "soft drugs" falls into categories ranging from low moderate to very high, depending on the amount of drugs possessed.

⁶⁹ These categories are identified by reference to "salient factor scores," which attempt to predict the probability of recidivism.

mission's admission that only 8.7% of the parolees in 1975 were released before the "customary release date," and by the apparent practice of referring only to the guidelines in denials of parole.⁷⁰ The Commission responds that under its regulations all "relevant evidence" is taken into account,⁷¹ that decisions outside of the guidelines are permitted where circumstances warrant,⁷² and that in fact guidelines represent "objective standards by which the *ad hoc* judgment of an individual's offense severity is measured."⁷³ However, the Commission presented no affidavits as to the actual working of parole decision-making. And on this subject, there appears to be a genuine difference regarding material facts.

Equally important, Geraghty notes that the sentence actually imposed by the trial judge is not a factor in determining the customary release date, and avers that under current procedures the sentence is not given any weight in the individual parole-determination process. He observes that current regulations have removed the prescribed sentence from the con-

⁷⁰ The statement of reasons which was given to Geraghty, for example, was duplicated in *Garcia v. United States Bd. of Parole*, 557 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1977); *Hill v. Attorney General*, 550 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977) and *Fronczak v. Warden*, 553 F.2d 1219 (10th Cir. 1977). The Second Circuit has manifested disapproval of "mechanical" application of the guidelines by the Parole Board. *United States v. Jackson*, 550 F.2d 830, 832 (2d Cir. 1977); *United States v. Cruz*, 544 F.2d 1162, 1164-65 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976); *United States v. Torun*, 537 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1976).

⁷¹ 28 C.F.R. § 2.19(b).

⁷² 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(c).

⁷³ Government's answer ¶ 37. A38.

siderations which must be taken into account. Significantly, the Commission, in its trial brief, admitted that no weight is given to the length of the sentence imposed by the trial judge.⁷⁴

Since this case comes before us from a dismissal by summary judgment, and since Geraghty has provided factual support for his characterization of the guidelines, we must take his account as correct for purposes of this appeal.⁷⁵

2. The Legislation

Although in 1973, the Parole Board had promulgated guidelines substantially similar to those currently being questioned, the first legislative authorization for such guidelines was contained in the PCRA of 1976. As part of a legislative overhaul of the parole system, the 1976 Act granted the newly-established Parole Commission the power and the duty to:

promulgate rules and regulations establishing guidelines for the power [to grant or deny parole].

18 U.S.C. § 4203(a)(1) (1976).

⁷⁴ Defendant's brief in opposition to petition for habeas corpus. (Filed Dec. 13, 1976) p. 19 n.8. The Board had previously asserted that to take sentence length into account in the guidelines would impede the guidelines' purpose of eliminating sentence disparity. 40 Fed. Reg. 41350 (1975). Cf. *United States v. Solly*, 559 F.2d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1977) (neither sentence length nor trial judge's assessment of culpability has "apparent effect" on release decision).

⁷⁵ However, since the Parole Commission has presented contradictory material, and since a large part of Geraghty's proof is inferential, the case cannot be resolved by summary judgment in Geraghty's favor on the basis of the present record.

These guidelines are to be used in making parole decisions in accordance with statutory criteria:

(a) If an eligible prisoner has substantially observed the rules of the institution or institutions to which he has been confined, and if the Commission, upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the prisoner, determines:

(1) that release would not depreciate the seriousness of his offense or promote disrespect for the law; and

(2) that release would not jeopardize the public welfare; subject to the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section and pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the Commission pursuant to section 4203(a)(1), such prisoner shall be released.

18 U.S.C. § 4206 (1976).

Geraghty points to the statutory mandate that the parole decision be based on the "nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the prisoner." He maintains that under the guidelines, as they are utilized by the Commission, prisoners are denied individualized consideration of the "nature and circumstances" of their offenses, a consideration directed by the statute.

The Commission replies that nothing in the statute explicitly constrains its discretion in this regard. It

declares that in the first instance, the "nature and circumstances" are evaluated in the course of assigning a "severity rating" and, in any event, the provision in its regulations for decisions outside the guidelines satisfies any further statutory requirements.

Moreover, the Commission observes that while the statute explicitly requires consideration of a number of factors,⁷⁶ the length of the sentence imposed is not among them. Geraghty answers that since the control by the trial judge over the sentencing process is an integral feature of the criminal justice system as currently structured, the sentence actually imposed is "additional relevant information" whose consideration by the Commission must necessarily have been contemplated by Congress.

The text of the statute, in our opinion, seems capable of supporting either interpretation advanced. We therefore turn to other lines of analysis.

⁷⁶ In making a determination under this chapter (relating to release on parole) the Commission shall consider, if available and relevant:

- (1) reports and recommendations which the staff of the facility in which such prisoner is confined may make;
- (2) official reports of the prisoner's prior criminal record, including a report or record of earlier probation and parole experiences;
- (3) presentence investigation reports;
- (4) recommendations regarding the prisoner's parole made at the time of sentencing by the sentencing judge; and
- (5) reports of physical, mental, or psychiatric examination of the offender.

There shall also be taken into consideration such additional relevant information concerning the prisoner (including information submitted by the prisoner) as may be reasonably available.

18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1976).

3. The Legislative History

Geraghty contends that, before the guidelines came into effect, the length of sentence imposed by the trial judge—rather than the Parole Commission's evaluation of the "severity" of the offense—constituted the primary means of establishing the length of imprisonment necessary to vindicate society's interest in incarceration.⁷⁷ Whether or not this is accurate, under H.R. 5727, the direct ancestor of the PCRA,⁷⁸ the sentence imposed by the trial judge was of controlling significance. Under H.R. 5727, a federal prisoner with good institutional behavior was to have been released upon completion of one-third of his sentence, unless the Commission affirmatively found release to be undesir-

⁷⁷ The primary basis for this assertion is a study of the North Carolina parole system which found sentence length to be a primary determinant of length of imprisonment. This is not persuasive evidence of the characteristics of the Federal Parole System. Nonetheless, one study found that the belief was widespread among federal judges prior to the guidelines that the Parole Board's decisions were or should be based on judgments as to rehabilitation, rather than evaluations of severity. *Yale Note*, *supra* note 2 at 882-83 n.361, 890 n.388; see *Addonizio v. United States*, Nos. 77-1542, 77-1621, 77-2373 (3d Cir. Feb. 16, 1978). And the Commission has presented no evidence which convinces us that the primacy accorded to its severity judgment is reflective of practice prior to the guidelines.

⁷⁸ The PCRA was reported from the House Judiciary Committee on May 13, 1975 as HR 5727, accompanied by H. Rept. 94-184. It was considered and passed by the House on May 21, 1975.

The Senate Judiciary Committee reported an amended version of H.R. 5727 on Sept. 11, 1975, accompanied by Sen. Rept. 94-369. The amended version was passed by the Senate on Sept. 16, 1975.

A House-Senate conference committee reported a compromise bill on Feb. 23, 1976, and Feb. 24, 1976, respectively. The amended bill passed the Senate on March 2, 1976, and the House on March 3, 1976. See 1976 U.S. Code of Cong. & Admin. News 335.

able under the statutory criteria.⁷⁹ The virtue of having a "definite parole date at one-third of the sentence"⁸⁰ was the aspect of the bill which prompted the greatest comment in floor debate,⁸¹ and no remarks by any Congressman indicate that the Commission was to be responsible for re-evaluating the adequacy of sentences.

There is no implication in the legislative history of the House Bill that the approach of the guidelines in establishing classes of offenders based on the Parole Commission's views of the severity rating of "offenses" in general was to have been ratified by the legislation. Indeed, comments during the floor debates manifest hostility to such an approach.⁸²

⁷⁹ § 4205 (House version)

"(a). A prisoner shall be released on parole if his record shows that he has substantially observed the rules of the institution in which he is confined on the date of his eligibility for parole, unless it is determined by an examining panel (as provided in section 4207(a)) that he should not be released on such date for one or more of the following reasons:

- (1) there is a reasonable probability that such prisoner will not live and remain at liberty without violating any criminal law.
- (2) there is a reasonable probability that such release would be incompatible with the welfare or society; or
- (3) the prisoner's release on such date would so depreciate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.

⁸⁰ Comments of Congressman Rodino, 121 Cong. Rec. H. 4510 (daily ed. May 21, 1975).

⁸¹ See e.g. Comments of Congressman Kastenmeir *id.* at H. 4511; Comments of Congressman Railsback *id.* at H. 4511; Comments of Congressman Danielson *id.* at H. 4512; Comments of Congressman Badillo *id.* at H. 4516; Comments of Congressman Coghlin *id.* at H. 4516.

⁸² Comments of Congressman Drinan at *id.* H. 4513 ("the committee clearly expressed its objection to a checklist or prototype denial statement"); Comments of Congressman Gude at *id.* at H. 4518 (Bill would produce "far

In contrast, the Senate version of the legislation anticipated the adoption of guidelines identical with those then in existence under the Parole Board.⁸³ These would guide the Commission in deciding whether the prerequisites for parole exist: "a reasonable probability that such person will remain at liberty, without violating the law," and "release is not incompatible with the welfare of society."⁸⁴ The decision was to be made substantially on the basis of "a report by the proper institutional officer," and the Commission's investigation.⁸⁵

Further, in contrast to the House Bill, the Senate Bill specifically envisioned the new Commission's responsibility as encompassing revision of inappropri-

82. (Cont'd.)

greater scrutiny and understanding of each prisoner's record, both before and during incarceration"). Rep. Gude was "greatly disturbed" by the apparently mechanical interaction of the "severity rating" and "salient factor score."

⁸³ Remarks of Senator Burdick, 121 Cong. Rec. S. 15953 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1975) ("the rules and regulations repeatedly cited in the legislation include a set of guidelines adopted by the Parole Board."); Sen. Rept. No. 94-369, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 [hereinafter, Senate Report], 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 346 (describing operation of system contemplated by statute "in relation to the present guidelines system").

Even the Senate version, however, recognized the danger of allowing too little discretion in the parole decision which "fails to take into account aggravating or mitigating circumstances of an offense, as well as the personal and family considerations which are the strongest predictors of whether or not the individual will return to a life of crime, or will be able to live a law-abiding life-style following release from incarceration." (remarks of Senator Burdick, *supra* at S. 15954). Senator Burdick considered that the Senate Bill "incorporated these factors" *id.*

⁸⁴ § 4206(a). (Senate version)

⁸⁵ § 4206(b). (Senate version)

ate judicially imposed sentences. The introduction to the Senate Report described parole as "an extension of the sentencing process."⁸⁶ The Report also referred to the "benefits" of the guidelines in "reducing the opportunity for sentencing disparity" and ensuring that "offenders sentenced for similar crime under similar circumstances will be required to serve comparable periods of incarceration" regardless of the statute under which they are sentenced.⁸⁷ Such a function would, of course, not be possible if the length of sentence imposed itself entered into the parole decision.

In the words of Congressman Kastenmeir, a sponsor of the House version, the bill which ultimately emerged from the Conference "required considerable compromise on the part of conferees on both sides."⁸⁸ The controlling effect of the sentence length was eliminated, but on the other hand characterization of parole as an "extension of the sentencing process" was deleted from the statement of purposes otherwise identical with the Senate version.⁸⁹ The Bill is described as "having the practical effect of balancing differences in sentencing policies between judges and courts," rather than having the purpose of eliminating sentencing disparities.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Senate Report at p. 15, 1976 U.S. Code, Cong. & Adm. News 337.

⁸⁷ *Id.* at 18-19 and 340.

⁸⁸ 122 Cong. Rec. H. 1499 (daily ed. March 3, 1976).

⁸⁹ Conference Report at 19-20, 1976 U.S. Code, Cong. & Adm. News 351-52.

⁹⁰ *Id.* at 19, 352 (emphasis supplied).

Unlike the Senate version, the legislative history of the conference bill did not contain explicit endorsement of the guidelines as they were currently promulgated,⁹¹ and the Commission was directed to be "cognizant of past criticism of parole decision making."⁹² Moreover, a provision for judicial review of the guidelines themselves was adopted from the House version.

In describing the parole eligibility criteria, the Conference Report stated:

[I]t is the intent of the conferees that the Parole Commission review and consider both the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the prisoner . . . the Parole Commission, in making each parole determination shall recognize and make a determination as to the relative severity of the prospective parolee's offense. . . .⁹³

The parole decision makers, apparently in each case, must weigh the concepts of general and special deterrence, retribution and punishment, all of

⁹¹ We understand the conferees' statement, that the statute "removes doubt as to the legality of changes implemented by administrative reorganization, and makes the improvements permanent" *id.* at 20, 353, to refer to an endorsement of the use of guidelines in the context of a decentralized hearing examiner structure, not as an adoption of the substance of the guidelines, or their then-current use. In this regard, we respectfully disagree with the statements in *Banks v. United States*, 553 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1977) that the Committee approved the then-current guidelines and that a primary purpose of the PCRA was to reduce sentence disparity. *Cf. Garcia v. United States Bd. of Parole*, 557 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding Parole Commission authorized by PCRA to take account of offense severity in guidelines, but declining to rule on whether guidelines are consistent with PCRA).

⁹² Conference Report at 26, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 359.

⁹³ *Id.* at 25, 358.

which are matters of judgment . . . and come up with determinations of what is meant by "would not depreciate the seriousness of the offense or promote disrespect for the law" that, to the extent possible, are not inconsistent with findings of other parole decisions."⁹⁴

As an example of this process, the conferees postulate a situation in which a public official is convicted of fraud and sentenced to three years imprisonment. In such a case, states the Report, "his release on parole after one year might satisfy the depreciate the seriousness criterion, but the Commission could justify denying release on grounds that such release would promote disrespect for the law."⁹⁵

If Geraghty's description of the effect given the parole guidelines by the Commission is accurate, the Commission in effect is following the views of the Senate version of the PCRA, rather than the policies of the Conference Committee.

According to Geraghty's description, the Commission attempts to eliminate sentence disparity by completely ignoring the length of sentence imposed by the trial judge.⁹⁶ This policy would fail to acknowledge

⁹⁴ *Id.* at 26, 358.

⁹⁵ *Id.*

⁹⁶ See Complaint; note 74 *supra*; *Cf. United States v. Randle*, 408 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1975). ("In effect, the Parole Board has substituted its guidelines for the judgment of the sentencing judge as to the appropriate sentence for a particular defendant.")

that under the Conference version, a leveling of sentence disparity is a by-product of other policies, rather than a goal. In its hypothetical the Conference Committee apparently saw the length of sentence as being a relevant factor. To fail to take account of the length of sentence imposed is thus at odds with the contemplated effect of the legislation. The fact that the pre-PCRA guidelines ignored sentence length is not dispositive since the accompanying regulations at that time explicitly mandated that length of sentence be taken into account in considering deviation from the guidelines.⁹⁷

Similarly, Geraghty alleges that the guidelines were derived by a grouping of offenses into severity levels by the Commission and by subsequently averaging the time customarily served by prisoners in each "level," and that these levels are given controlling effect by the Commission to the exclusion of other factors. Such a process seems significantly different from the contemplation of the conferees that in structuring "each parole determination [the Commission] shall make a determination as to the relative severity of the prospective parolees offense."⁹⁸ Nor is it consistent with the procedure contemplated in the Committee's hypothetical. And the refusal to incorporate the previous individualized determination by the trial judge would exacerbate this difficulty.

⁹⁷ 40 Fed. Reg. 2331, August 1975.

⁹⁸ Conference Report at 25, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 358. (emphasis added).

Thus, if Geraghty's recapitulation of the function and genesis of the guidelines is supported by the evidence, there are important divergences between the Parole Commission's actions and the intent of Congress in enacting the statutory mandate.

4. *The Question of Constitutionality*

The differences between Congressional intent and the alleged operation of the guidelines also must be viewed against the backdrop of the disparities between the procedures Geraghty describes and the structure of the balance of the criminal justice system. To the extent that the Parole Commission makes individual judgments about the relative culpability of prisoners and the length of imprisonment proper to vindicate the needs of society yet fails to take account of the sentence imposed by the court, the Commission embarks, alone, on a task which is the traditional province of the judiciary. Insofar as the Commission attempts to make general rules as to the appropriate punishment for crimes which effectively bind parole decisions in all cases, it undertakes functions which are usually discharged by the legislature. Yet the Commission lacks the institutional safeguards of either the courts or the Congress: it has neither judicial independence and allegiance to the ideal of dispassionate and reasoned decisions nor legislative responsiveness to the popular will.

Such tensions and the accompanying constitutional doubts that they raise need not be resolved or cast a

shadow on the validity of the PCRA, of course, unless Congress has clearly authorized the assumption by the Commission of judicial and legislative functions.⁹⁹ In light of the legislative history discussed above, we find no such clear authorization in the PCRA.

(a) *Tensions with the Judiciary*

Federal criminal statutes generally provide a range of penalties from which the sentencing court must choose. In making such choices the federal courts draw on the perception that "For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular act by which the crime was committed, and that there be taken into account the characteristics and propensities of the individual."¹⁰⁰ The Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender."¹⁰¹

District courts may exercise their discretion in individual cases largely untrammelled by appellate re-

⁹⁹ See *National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. United States*, 415 U.S. 336 (1974).

¹⁰⁰ *Woodson v. North Carolina*, 428 U.S. 281, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion of Justices Stevens, Stewart and Powell) (quoting *Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe*, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937) as characterizing "prevailing practice."). See also *Gregg v. Georgia*, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion of Justices Stevens, Stewart and Powell).

¹⁰¹ *Williams v. New York*, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949); see *Chaffin v. Stynchcombe*, 412 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1973).

view.¹⁰² They are not free, however, to eschew the task they are called upon to perform by adopting rules to fix given punishments on given classes of offenders. Such a position by the sentencing judge would constitute an abuse of discretion calling for a vacation of the sentence imposed.¹⁰³

If the PCRA provided for the guidelines to function as Geraghty alleges, a federal defendant would find himself in the anomalous situation of being sentenced by a judge who is forbidden to utilize fixed penalties, but having parole granted by a Commission that is required to use such penalties and which, at the same time, refuses to take account of the decision of the sentencing court. The rigid categories called for by the parole guidelines would frequently nullify the discretion which the trial judges are required to

¹⁰² *Dorszynski v. United States*, 418 U.S. 424 (1974); *Gore v. United States*, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958); *United States v. Bazzano*, No. 76-2584 slip op. at 18-19 (3d Cir. 1977) (Adams, J. concurring).

¹⁰³ See e.g. *United States v. Negron*, 548 F.2d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1977); *cert. denied* — U.S. —, *United States v. Foss*, 501 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1974); *United States v. Schwartz*, 500 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1974); *Woolsey v. United States*, 478 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1973) (*en banc*); *United States v. Hartford*, 489 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1974); *United States v. Charles*, 460 F.2d 1093 (6th Cir. 1972); *United States v. Baker*, 487 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1973); *United States v. Daniels*, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971); *United States v. McCoy*, 429 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1970); *Cf. United States v. Thompson*, 483 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1973) *cert. denied* 415 U.S. 911 (1974) (disqualifying judge because of "fixed view" that draft offenders must serve 30 months); *United States v. Townsend*, 478 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1972) (*semble*). While this rule has been attributed to "enlightened policy rather than constitutional imperative", *Woodson*, 428 U.S. 280, 303-305 (1976), it has been argued that in situations where grave constitutional interests are at stake, "structural due process" requires individualized decision making. See *Tribe, Structural Due Process*, 10 Harv. Civ. Rts.-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 269 (1975); *Crawford v. Cushman*, 531 F.2d 1114, 1125 (2d Cir. 1976).

exercise in evaluating each case on its individual merits.

It may well be that Congress itself could foreclose all sentencing options.¹⁰⁴ But, absent a clear statement of such a purpose, we should be wary of attributing to Congress the intent to allow the Parole Commission to undertake such a wide-ranging overhaul of the criminal sentencing process.

This is particularly so in view of the fact that the Commission has disclaimed any intention of giving rehabilitation a major role in its parole decisions.¹⁰⁵ Parole has traditionally been conceived of as "an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals [whose] purpose is to help individuals re-integrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as they are able."¹⁰⁶ For such a purpose, the Commission, which can observe the prisoner during incarceration, has a significant advantage over the court in determining eligibility for parole under a standard which is distinct from the traditional role of the judiciary.¹⁰⁷ When, however, the parole author-

¹⁰⁴ See *Marshall v. United States*, 414 U.S. 417 (1974) (upholding statute which denies drug rehabilitation sentence to two-time felons).

¹⁰⁵ C.F.R. 41329-30 (Sept. 5, 1975).

¹⁰⁶ *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972). See *Gagnon v. Scapparelli*, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973) ("the rehabilitative rather than punitive focus of the parole/probation system"); *Zerbst v. Kidwell*, 304 U.S. 359, 363 (1938) ("a means of restoring offenders who are good social risks to society").

¹⁰⁷ *Cf. United States v. Murray*, 275 U.S. 347 (1927) ("The parole statute provides a board to be invested with full opportunity to watch the conduct of penitentiary convicts.")

ity focuses consideration entirely on factors of deterrence, incapacitation and retribution, it takes into account almost exclusively the very factors that are available to the sentencing judge. The Commission then begins to perform functions which are within the traditional province of the judiciary.¹⁰⁸ At least where the prior determination of the judicial branch are given no weight, therefore, serious questions are raised whether the constitutional protections provided by an independent judiciary are being undermined.¹⁰⁹ Since Congress has manifested no clear intention to raise such questions, we do not interpret the PCRA as authorizing such disregard of judicial sentences.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ See, *Ex Parte United States*, 242 U.S. 27, 41 (1916) ("indisputably, under our constitutional system, the right to try offenses against the criminal laws and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial"); Yale Note *supra* note 2, at 892-893; cf. *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (penalty of "hard labor" is an infamous punishment and therefore cannot be administratively imposed). *North Carolina v. Russell*, 427 U.S. 328 (1976) (criminal trial before non-law trained judge is constitutional if trial *de novo* is available).

In view of this alteration in functions, prior cases upholding the federal parole statute against challenges based on alleged usurpation of judicial functions would not seem dispositive. *E.g. Sims v. Rives*, 84 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1936); see *Commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Cain*, 345 Pa. 581, 28 A.2d 897, 143 A.L.R. 1973 (1942); Annotation, 143 A.L.R. 1726 (1942). Cf. *Dreyer v. Illinois*, 187 U.S. 71, 78-84 (1902) (Illinois indeterminate sentence act did not violate due process by vesting parole power in executive).

¹⁰⁹ See *United States v. Brown*, 381 U.S. 437, 441-447 (1965) (separation of powers is at the root of Bill of Attainder clause, and "the legislative branch is not so well suited as politically independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness of and levying appropriate punishment upon specific persons").

¹¹⁰ Cf. *Duncan v. Kahanamoku*, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (since Congress "did not explicitly declare" civil courts supplanted under martial law statute, Court rejected such authority in light of "principles and practices developed during the birth and growth of our political institutions."); *Soloway v.*

(b) Delegation of Legislative Functions

The determination of the proper range of punishment which may be levied in regard to a class of crimes, like the determination of what actions are criminal, is within the ambit of the legislative prerogative.¹¹¹ "Because of the seriousness of criminal penalties," they should in general attach only after the body responsible for forming our laws in the first in-

110. (Cont'd.)

Weger, 389 F. Supp. 409, 411 (W.D. Pa. 1974) ("blind adherence" to guidelines "may well be" intrusion into court's sentencing role in excess of statutorily conferred powers of Parole Board); Kastenmeier & Eglit, *Parole Release Decision-Making; Rehabilitation, Expertise and the Demise of Mythology*, 22 Am. U. L. Rev. 477, 494, 495, 508, 522 (1973) (questioning assumption by Parole Board of judicial role of evaluating severity of offense in absence of legislative authorization). See generally Gewirtz, *The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy Making; Notes on Three Doctrines*, 1976, *Law and Cont. Prob.* 46. But cf. *Wiley v. United States Bd. of Parole*, 380 F. Supp. 1194, 1196-97 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (upholding guidelines against challenge that they amounted to "resences"); *Manos v. United States Board of Parole*, 399 F. Supp. 1103, 1105 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (guidelines are "constitutional"). *Garcia v. United States Bd. of Parole*, 409 F. Supp. 1230, 1238-39 (N.D. filed 1976) *revid on other grounds*, 557 F.2d 100 (1972) (holding guidelines are not "usurpation" of sentencing function).

¹¹¹ See *United States v. Bass*, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) ("Because of the seriousness of penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity"); *Bell v. United States*, 349 U.S. 81, 89 (1955) ("The punishment appropriate for the diverse federal offenses is a matter for the discretion of Congress"); *Ex Parte Grossman*, 267 U.S. 87 (1925) ("The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it" before it may be punished); *Ex Parte United States*, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916) ("indisputable also is that the authority to define and fix the punishment of a crime is legislative"); *United States v. Wiltberger*, 18 U.S. [5 Wheat] 35, 43 (1820) ("the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative not in the judicial department. It is the legislature not the court which is to define a crime and ordain its punishment"); *Schick v. Reed*, 419 U.S. 256, 274-76 (1974) ("Prescribing punishment is a prerogative reserved for the lawmaking branch of government, the legislature") (Marshall, J. dissenting).

stance has established that such penalties are appropriate.¹¹² Criminal sanctions serve an amalgam of social goals, and their severity is best determined by a body which can respond to the balance of such goals as prescribed by the popular will.¹¹³

If the parole guidelines function as automatically as Geraghty alleges that they do, the Commission is effectively redrafting the penalty provisions of the United States criminal code.¹¹⁴ The severity levels of the guidelines neither "fill in the details" of an otherwise complete statutory scheme,¹¹⁵ nor perform a new

¹¹² *United States v. Bass*, 404 U.S. 346, 348 (1971). Cf. *Gutknecht v. United States*, 396 U.S. 295 (1970) (draft board is not authorized to punitively induct registrant who turned in registration card).

Unlike the case of *Schick v. Reed*, 419 U.S. 256 (1974), in which the Court upheld the imposition of conditions in connection with a presidential pardon, the parole board's authority does not find its roots in the pardoning powers of Article II, but in specific legislative delegation. In 1927, seventeen years after the enactment of the federal parole statute, the Supreme Court undertook to survey the various forms of reduction of sentence available to prisoners. *United States v. Murray*, 275 U.S. 347 (1927) (construing probation act). It discerned "three different methods of mitigation:" the judicial probation authority granted by statute; "clemency by the President under the Constitution;" and "the power of parole by a Board of Parole abating judicial punishment."

¹¹³ See *Yale Note supra* note 2 at 888.

¹¹⁴ In 41 Fed. Reg. 37316 (3 Sept. 1976), for example, the offense severity for immigration law violators was augmented as a result of the "Commission's concern with the increasing numbers of immigration law violators in recent years." Such a judgment appears to be one that is appropriate in the first instance for the Congress.

¹¹⁵ It is clear that the "severity levels" in the parole guidelines do not correspond to the maximum punishments provided by Congress. While uttering a counterfeit note carries a statutory maximum of 15 years (18 U.S.C. § 472 (1970)), if the currency passed does not exceed \$1,000, the Commission classes the offense as "low moderate." In contrast, mailing an anonymous threat to property, a violation whose statutory penalty is 2 years in jail (18 U.S.C. § 876

administrative function necessitated by novel regulatory legislation.

Whether or not federal criminal penalties should be redrafted¹¹⁶ it is of dubious constitutional propriety to delegate so crucial a legislative function to a non-representative body with no standards other than a direction that the results "not depreciate the seriousness of the offense" and "be consistent with the public welfare." Accordingly, we decline to read such a delegation into the PCRA.¹¹⁷

115. (Cont'd.)

(1970)), is classified as "moderate" severity, requiring a longer sentence to be served before parole.

Illegally selling alcohol in the vicinity of Indian schools (18 U.S.C. § 1154 (1970) and violation of the Mann Act (18 U.S.C. § 2421 et seq. (1970)) are classified as "low moderate" and "high" severity crimes respectively, despite the fact that they carry identical 5 year penalties. Misprision of a felony, (18 U.S.C. § 4 (1970)) and extortion by a United States employee (18 U.S.C. § 872 (1970)) are each punishable by a maximum of 3 years imprisonment, yet the former is rated as a "moderately" severe crime, and the latter is determined to be of "very high" severity. Both carry lighter sentences than the Selective Service violations (50 App. U.S.C. § 462 (repealed) (5 year penalty)) which the Commission treats as "low-moderate" severity.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Senate Bill 1437, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977), Reported S. Rept. 95-605, 123 Cong. Rec. S 19037 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1977) (providing for comprehensive code of criminal penalties and sentence review). Since S. 1437 would also largely eliminate parole, many of the difficulties raised by the Parole Commission's *modus operandi* would, if S. 1437 is enacted, become truly moot.

¹¹⁷ See *National Cable Television Assn. v. United States*, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) (statute should not be construed to delegate taxing power without appropriate standards); *Arizona v. California*, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (statute should not be read to delegate power to allocate water without appropriate standards); *L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law* § 15-17, 284-291 (1978); *Gewirtz, supra* note 110, *Wright, Book Review, Beyond Discretionary Justice*, 81 Yale L.J. 575, 580, 582-87 (1972) (Wright, J.); *Friedman, Review, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence*, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 307 (1976).

This is not, of course, to say that no guidelines of any sort may issue under the PCRA, for some guidelines were clearly intended. Indeed such guidelines may constitute a laudable means of avoiding arbitrary decision-making. Issues of separation of powers involve subtle inquiries, sensitive to the precise dimensions of the power being exercised. Thus, if the guidelines function as the Commission contends, guiding but not controlling discretion, a different issue would be presented. They would then partake less of the character of fixed penalties than if Geraghty is correct, and would perform functions less like those of legislation. And guidelines which use the actual sentence imposed as a starting point would be akin to the exercise of sentencing discretion which the Congress may validly delegate to the courts. Such questions, however, may be disposed of only on a full record setting forth the actual functioning of the guidelines.

B. *Ex Post Facto* Effect of the Guidelines

At the time he was sentenced in the late summer of 1973, Geraghty was eligible for parole as soon as he was incarcerated.¹¹⁸ The grant or denial of parole, according to the then-current statute, was to result from a determination by the Board whether: (a) there is reasonable probability that the prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws;

¹¹⁸ Since Geraghty was sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (1970), he became eligible for parole immediately upon incarceration.

and (b) such release in the opinion of the Board is not incompatible with the welfare of society.¹¹⁹

At the time of his first parole hearing, guidelines adopted by the Commission subsequent to Geraghty's sentence established a "customary time to be served before release" of 26-36 months for prisoners who had committed crimes as "severe" as the one for which Geraghty was convicted. And, claims Geraghty, less than one prisoner in ten is paroled before his "customary release date."¹²⁰ Consequently, Geraghty challenges the application of the parole guidelines to him, and others similarly situated, as constitutionally forbidden *ex post facto* laws.

1. *Outlines of Ex Post Facto* Prohibition

By the time of the American Revolution, Blackstone had classed *ex post facto* laws with those of Caligula: "all punishment [for violating them] must be cruel and unjust."¹²¹ In response to similar sentiments, as well as recent experience with oppressive *ex post facto* laws,¹²² the framers of the Constitution considered the necessity of guarding against such excesses strongly enough to include within the Constitution two prohibitions against *ex post facto* laws.¹²³

¹¹⁹ 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970).

¹²⁰ Defendants Answer to Complaint ¶ 48. A39.

¹²¹ 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *46.

¹²² See Crosskey, *The True Meaning of the Constitutional Prohibition of Ex Post Facto Laws*, 14 U. Chi. L. Rev. 539 (1947); Note, *Ex Post Facto Limitations on Legislative Power*, 73 Mich. 1491, 1500-01 (1975).

¹²³ Art. I § 9 and § 10. For an excellent recent analysis of the *ex post facto* clause, see Tribe, *supra* note 117, 474-484 §§ 10-1-10-3.

These "bulwarks in favor of the personal security of the subject" were early read to be exclusively limitations on the exercise of the power to punish crimes.¹²⁴ According to the celebrated case of *Calder v. Bull*, the interdiction included laws "aggravating a crime or mak[ing] it greater than it was, when committed" and laws "chang[ing] the punishment, and inflict[ing] a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed."¹²⁵

But within the criminal sphere, the Supreme Court opted for a broad reading of the proscriptions: the definition of *Calder* was not exclusive, but merely indicative. Any law

passed after the commission of an offense which . . . 'in relation to that offense or its consequences alters the position of a party to his disadvantage' is an *ex post facto* law.¹²⁶

Such alteration has been held to include not only liability for greater penalties, but aggravation of the conditions of the punishment imposed.¹²⁷ The test is

¹²⁴ *Calder v. Bull*, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 385, 390 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). See *United States Trust v. New Jersey*, 45 U.S.L.W. 4418, 4422 n.13 (1977).

¹²⁵ *Calder v. Bull*, 3 U.S. [3 Dallas] at 390.

¹²⁶ *Kring v. Missouri*, 107 U.S. 221, 235 (1882) quoting *United States v. Hill*, 2 Wash. 366, *aff'd* 10 U.S. [6 Cranch] 171 (1810) (repeal of provision that conviction of second degree murder operated as acquittal of first degree murder). The court in *Kring* went on to say: "No one can be criminally punished in this country except according to a law prescribed for his government by the sovereign authorities before the imputed offense was committed, and which existed as a law at that time."

¹²⁷ *In re Medley*, 134 U.S. 160 (1890) (new law mandating convicted murderer be kept in solitary confinement until execution and that warden should set date of execution without informing prisoner violated *ex post facto* clause).

not whether the punishment actually received is within the outer limits of the law at the time the crime was committed, but whether "the later standard of punishment is more onerous than the earlier."¹²⁸

Thus, in *Lindsey v. Washington*, the Supreme Court held that a statute which altered a criminal penalty from a 1 to 15-year sentence to a 15-year indeterminate sentence with possibility of parole operated as an *ex post facto* law when applied to a crime which had taken place before the amendment. The Court said:

It is true that petitioner might have been sentenced to 15 years under the old statute. But the *ex post facto* clause looks to the standard of punishment prescribed by the statute rather than to the actual punishment imposed. The Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated to the detriment or material disadvantage of a wrongdoer. [citations omitted] It is for this reason that an increase in the possible penalty is *ex post facto* [citations omitted] . . . regardless of the length of the penalty actually imposed. . . .

We need not inquire whether this is technically an increase in the punishment annexed to the crime, See *Calder v. Bull* at 390. It is plainly to the substantial disadvantage of the petitioners to be deprived of all opportunity to receive a sentence which would give them freedom from cus-

¹²⁸ *Lindsey v. Washington*, 301 U.S. 397, 400 (1937).

tody and control prior to the expiration of their 15 year term.¹²⁹

2. *Ex Post Facto* and Parole

The plaintiff in this case had no more guarantee of receiving parole before his "customary release date" than did the petitioners in *Lindsey* of receiving less than a maximum sentence. Like the adoption of mandatory 15 year sentence in *Lindsey*, however, the promulgation of a 26 month "customary release date" deprived Geraghty of the possibility of a substantially more lenient punishment. The similarity between Geraghty's position and that of the petitioners in *Lindsey* elicits concern whether the guidelines are at odds with the *ex post facto* prohibition. Our doubts are heightened by the two Supreme Court determinations which have touched upon the subject of parole and the *ex post facto* clause.

In *Warden v. Marrero*,¹³⁰ the Court held that for purposes of a repeal of a statute barring parole for drug offenders, parole eligibility is effectively determined at the time of sentencing, and that therefore eligibility for parole is part of the "punishment" within the meaning of the statute.¹³¹ The Court, how-

¹²⁹ *Lindsey* was recently interpreted in *Dobbert v. Florida*, 45 U.S.L.W. 4721, 4726 (1977) as holding that "one is not barred from challenging a change in the penal code on *ex post facto* grounds simply because the sentence he received under the new law was not more onerous than that which he might have received under the old."

¹³⁰ 417 U.S. 653 (1974).

¹³¹ 417 U.S. at 658-661.

ever, gave two additional reasons for treating parole eligibility as part of the punishment:

First, only an unusual prisoner could be expected to think that he was not suffering a penalty when he was denied eligibility for parole. [citations omitted] For the convicted prisoner, parole—even with its legal constraints—is a long step toward regaining freedom. . . .

Second, a repealer of parole eligibility previously available to imprisoned offenders would clearly present the serious question under the *ex post facto* clause of Art. I § 9 cl. 3 of the Constitution, of whether it imposed "greater or more severe punishment than was prescribed by law at the time of the . . . offense." [citations omitted]¹³²

Similarly, in *Greenfield v. Scafati*,¹³³ a three-judge court struck down a statute depriving parole violators of accumulated good time upon their return to prison, as applied to a prisoner who had been sentenced before the law went into effect. Since the possible loss of good time for parole violation was in effect a potential lengthening of the sentence, the Court held that imposition of such a penalty with respect to the petitioner was an impermissible *ex post facto* law. In response to the argument that the plaintiff had, by his

¹³² 417 U.S. at 662-63.

¹³³ 277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967) *aff'd* 390 U.S. 713 (1968).

acceptance of parole, acceded to the condition, the Court declared:

[W]e see no distinction between depriving a prisoner of the right to earn good conduct deductions and the right to qualify for, and hence earn, parole. Each, to quote *in re Medley, supra*, "materially alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage."¹³⁴

Thus, the Court held, imposing the risk of loss of good time as a condition for parole violated the *ex post facto* prohibition. The Supreme Court affirmed without opinion.¹³⁵

In light of *Marrero* and *Scafati*, along with the *ex post facto* decisions canvassed earlier, we conclude that were a statute to deprive already incarcerated or sentenced prisoners of the possibility of parole for the first 26 months of their sentence, when such was not the situation at the time of the sentence, that statute would be unconstitutional.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ 277 F. Supp. at 646.

¹³⁵ 390 U.S. 712 (1968).

¹³⁶ This Court held in *U.S. ex rel. Forino v. Garfinkel*, 166 F.2d 887 (1948) that repeal of a provision removing civil disabilities upon completion of a sentence was not an *ex post facto* law. This holding has been substantially undercut by the Supreme Court's affirmance of *Scafati*. It has also been rendered inapplicable to this case by the recognition of parole and good time as protected liberty interests. *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) and *Wolff v. McDonnell*, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).

We likewise decline to follow, and question the continued viability of *Singleton v. Shafer*, 313 F. Supp. 1094 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (repeal of good time statute not *ex post facto*) and *Graham v. Thompson*, 246 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1957) (repeal of good time statute not *ex post facto*, resting on interpretation of Utah law).

The two courts of appeals which have considered the retroactive effect of the parole guidelines have reached conclusions similar to the ones thus far articulated. In *Shepard v. Taylor*,¹³⁷ the court considered the applicability of the parole guidelines to prisoners sentenced under the Youth Corrections Act. Judge Kaufman held that "official post-sentence action that delays eligibility for supervised release runs afoul of the *ex post facto* proscription."¹³⁸ Since the parole guidelines give substantial weight to offense severity, a factor which had been excluded from a decision to release under the Youth Corrections Act as it read at the time of sentencing, the Court determined that application of the guidelines to prisoners incarcerated under the original Youth Corrections Act would be unconstitutional. Likewise, in *Ruip v. United States*,¹³⁹ the court held that "In any practical analysis, parole consideration is a part of the new law annexed to the crime."¹⁴⁰

3. *Ex Post Facto* and the Guidelines

Both *Shepard* and *Ruip*, however, stated that the guidelines could be applied retroactively to adult offenders without trenching upon the *ex post facto* prohibition. This was so, the courts said, since the guide-

¹³⁷ 556 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1977).

¹³⁸ *Id.* at 654.

¹³⁹ 555 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1977).

¹⁴⁰ *Id.* at 1335.

lines "merely clarify the exercise of administrative discretion,"¹⁴¹ and "the commission remains free to make parole decisions outside of these guidelines."¹⁴² We respectfully differ with this conclusion.

From our analysis above, it is clear that the legislature could not retroactively, without offending the *ex post facto* clause of the Constitution, substantially decrease parole eligibility by legislation. We take it that a similar prohibition applies to an increase in punishment brought about by rule-making, the administrative equivalent of legislation.¹⁴³ The legislature cannot, by delegation, escape constitutional limitations on its power. And to maintain that the present parole guidelines enact no substantial limitation on parole eligibility may well be to misinterpret both the legal and practical effects of the guidelines.

The legal effects of the guidelines prior to the PCRA were examined in *Pickus v. U.S. Board of Parole*.¹⁴⁴ There, in holding the promulgation of the

¹⁴¹ *Shepard v. Taylor*, 556 F.2d at 654 (dictum).

¹⁴² *Ruip v. United States*, 555 F.2d at 1335. Cf. *Milhouse v. Levi*, 548 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (alteration of eligibility regulations for furlough program not *ex post facto* law since furlough, unlike parole, was not part of the punishment).

¹⁴³ *Love v. Fitzharris*, 460 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1972) vacated as moot 409 U.S. 1100 (1973) (change in administrative interpretation of parole statute). See *Marks v. United States*, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977) quoting *Bowie v. Columbia*, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) ("If a state legislature is barred by the *ex post facto* clause from passing such a law, it must follow that the state supreme court is barred by due process from achieving the same result by judicial construction.").

¹⁴⁴ 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

guidelines to be subject to the rule-making provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, the court explicitly rejected the contention that these guidelines were mere general policy statements. Rather, in comparison with earlier rules which were themselves "calculated to have a substantial impact on ultimate parole decisions," the guidelines "had an even greater impact on an inmate's chances for parole."

The rules defining parole selection criteria are substantive agency action, for they define a fairly tight framework to circumscribe the Board's statutorily broad power [T]hey are self-imposed controls over the manner and circumstances in which the agency will exercise its plenary power. They have the force of law.¹⁴⁵

As previously noted in the legislative history of the PCRA, the joint conference committee explicitly approved "the principles established in *Pickus*" with regard to the nature of the guidelines.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, the PCRA itself empowers the Commission to "grant or deny release on parole notwithstanding the guidelines . . . if it determines there is good cause for so doing."¹⁴⁷ "Good cause," however, according to the legislative history "for purposes of this section, means substantial reason."¹⁴⁸ It appears, therefore, that the

¹⁴⁵ 507 F.2d 1107 at 1113.

¹⁴⁶ Conference Report at 36, 1976 U.S. Code, Cong. & Adm. News 368.

¹⁴⁷ 18 U.S.C. 4206(c) (1976).

¹⁴⁸ Conference Report at 27, 1976 U.S. Code, Cong. & Adm. News 359.

guidelines are designed to be not mere hortatory "clarifications" of policy, but rules which are to be followed except for "substantial reason" to the contrary. The freedom of the Commission to grant parole prior to the customary release date is constrained, and the "situation" of prisoners otherwise eligible for parole is "altered to their disadvantage."

The *ex post facto* clause, however, reaches beyond mere formal alterations in criminal law.¹⁴⁹ Thus, if in practice the parole authorities found good cause to deviate from the guidelines in 60% of the cases, for example, it might be argued that their discretion is, in fact, unfettered. However, the material which we have before us points in the opposite direction. The Parole Commission's answer to the complaint in this case admits that in 1975 prisoners were granted parole prior to their "customary release dates" in only 8.7% of the cases.¹⁵⁰ Another decision of this Court took judicial notice of estimates of compliance with the guidelines ranging from 88% to 94%.¹⁵¹ It thus appears that

¹⁴⁹ See *Warden v. Marrero*, 417 U.S. 653, 663 (1974) (examining "practical effect" of parole limitations); *Dobbert v. Florida*, 45 U.S.L.W. 4721, 4725 (1977) ("We must compare the two procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous"); *Beasell v. Ohio*, 269 U.S. 167, 170 (1925) ("Just what alterations of procedure will be held to be of sufficient moment to transgress the constitutional prohibition cannot be embraced within a formula or stated in a general proposition. The distinction is one of degree. But the constitutional provision was intended to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation."); *In Re Medley*, 134 U.S. 160, 167-73 (1890) (analyzing practical effect of solitary confinement as increasing severity of punishment).

¹⁵⁰ Defendant's answer to ¶ 48. A39.

¹⁵¹ *United States v. Salerno*, 538 F.2d 1005, 1008 (1970). See Yale Note *supra* note 2, at 825 n.75, 869 n.293; *United States v. Solly*, 559 F.2d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1977).

the "channel for discretion" provided by the guidelines is in actuality an unyielding conduit.

Nonetheless, since the Commission intimates elsewhere in its answer that, in fact, it engages in individualized consideration of prisoners similar to that which it undertook before the guidelines went into effect, there appears to be a controverted issue of material fact, and on such issue, the case is inappropriate for summary judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

(1) The federal courts have jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Geraghty since the suit was properly brought as an action for declaratory judgment under the APA and the PCRA.

(2) If the class certification was improperly denied, a live legal controversy still exists despite Geraghty's release, and the action is not moot.

(3) It was error for the trial court to fail to consider the possibility of creating subclasses out of the over-inclusive and heterogeneous classes specified by the plaintiff, and therefore the case must be remanded to the trial court to evaluate the possibility of creating subclasses.¹⁵²

(4) The substantive claims set forth in the complaint were not properly subject to dismissal by sum-

¹⁵² The trial court should also examine the continued ability of Geraghty's counsel to represent such sub-classes adequately.

mary judgment. Plaintiff's contentions are supported by allegations sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact, and, if the averments are accurate, the parole guidelines as administered may well be inconsistent with the PCRA, and the parole guidelines as applied to certain prisoners may violate the *ex post facto* prohibition.

(5) If on remand the trial court determines that a proper class action should be maintained, factual support for the plaintiff's allegations regarding the operation of the parole system must be fully developed, and the Commission should have ample opportunity to establish the authenticity of its version of the operation of the guidelines.

The case will be reversed and remanded for action in accordance with this opinion.

GUIDELINES FOR DECISIONMAKING

[Customary total time to be served before release (including jail time)]

Offense characteristics—severity of offense behavior (examples)	Offender characteristics—parole prognosis (salient factor score) (in months)			
	Very good (11 to 9)	Good (8 to 6)	Fair (5 to 4)	Poor (3 to 0)
Low: Escape (open institution or program (e.g., CTC, work release)—absent less than 7 d). Marihuana or soft drugs, simple possession (small quantity for own use). Property offenses (theft or simple possession of stolen property) less than \$1,000.	6-10	8-12	10-14	12-18
Low moderate: Alcohol law violations Counterfeit currency (passing/possession less than \$1,000) Immigration law violations Income tax evasion (less than \$10,000) Property offenses (forgery/fraud/theft from mail/embezzlement/interstate transportation of stolen or forged securities/receiving stolen property with intent to resell) less than \$1,000. Selective Service Act violations	8-12	12-16	16-20	20-26
Moderate: Bribery of a public official (offering or accepting) Counterfeit currency (passing/possession \$1,000 to \$19,999) Drugs: Marihuana, possession with intent to distribute/sale (small scale (e.g., less than 50 lb)). "Soft drugs," possession with intent to distribute/sale (less than \$500). Escape (secure program or institution, or absent 7 d or more—no fear or threat used). Firearms Act, possession/purchase/sale (single weapon: not sawed-off shot-gun or machine gun).	12-16	16-20	20-24	24-32

Offense characteristics—severity of offense behavior (examples)	Offender characteristics—parole prognosis (salient factor score) (in months)			
	Very good (11 to 9)	Good (8 to 6)	Fair (5 to 4)	Poor (3 to 0)
Moderate Cont'd.				
Income tax evasion (\$10,000 to \$50,000)	12-16	16-20	20-24	24-32
Mailing threatening communication(s)				
Misprison of felony				
Property offenses (theft/forgery/fraud/embezzlement/interstate transportation of stolen or forged securities/receiving stolen property) \$1,000 to \$19,999.				
Smuggling/transportation of alien(s)				
Theft of motor vehicle (not multiple theft for resale)				
High:				
Counterfeit currency (passing/possession \$20,000 to \$100,000)	16-20	20-26	26-34	34-44
Counterfeiting (manufacturing)				
Drugs:				
Marihuana, possession with intent to distribute/sale (medium scale (e.g., 50 to 1,999 lbs)).				
"Soft drugs", possession with intent to distribute/sale (\$500 to \$5,000)				
Explosives, possession/transportation				
Firearms Act, possession/purchase/sale (sawed-off shotgun(s), machine gun(s), or multiple weapons).				
Mann Act (no force—commercial purposes)				
Theft of motor vehicle for resale				
Property offenses (theft/forgery/fraud/embezzlement/interstate transportation of stolen or forged securities/receiving stolen property) \$20,000 to \$100,000.				

RULES AND REGULATIONS

Offense characteristics—severity of offense behavior (examples)	Offender characteristics—parole prognosis (salient factor score) (in months)			
	Very good (11 to 9)	Good (8 to 6)	Fair (5 to 4)	Poor (3 to 0)
Very high:				
Robbery (weapon or threat)	26-36	36-48	48-60	60-72
Breaking and entering (bank or post office-entry or attempted entry to vault)				
Drugs:				
Marihuana, possession with intent to distribute/sale (large scale (e.g., 2,000 lb or more)).				
"Soft drugs", possession with intent to distribute/sale (over \$5,000)				
"Hard drugs", possession with intent to distribute/sale (not exceeding \$100,000).				
Extortion	26-36	36-48	48-60	60-72
Mann Act (force)				
Property offenses (theft/forgery/fraud/embezzlement/interstate transportation of stolen or forged securities/receiving stolen property) over \$100,000 not not exceeding \$500,000.				
Sexual act (force)				
Greatest:				
Aggravated felony (e.g., robbery, sexual act, aggravated assault)—weapon fired or personal injury.				
Aircraft hijacking				
Drugs: "Hard drugs", possession with intent to distribute/sale (in excess of \$100,000).				
Espionage				
Explosives (detonation)				
Kidnapping				
Willful homicide				

Greater than above—however, specific ranges are not given due to the limited number of cases and the extreme variation in severity possible within the category.

YOUTH/NARA

Offense characteristics—severity of offense behavior (examples)	Offender characteristics—parole prognosis (salient factor score) (in months)			
	Very good (11 to 9)	Good (8 to 6)	Fair (5 to 4)	Poor (3 to 0)
Low: Escape (open institution or program (e.g., CTC, work release)—absent less than 7 d). Marihuana or soft drugs, simple possession (small quantity for own use). Property offenses (theft or simple possession of stolen property) less than \$1,000. Low moderate: Alcohol law violations Counterfeit currency (passing/possession less than \$1,000) Immigration law violations Income tax evasion (less than \$10,000) Property offenses (forgery/fraud/theft from mail/embezzlement/interstate transportation of stolen or forged securities/receiving stolen property with intent to resell) less than \$1,000. Selective Service Act violations Moderate: Bribery of a public official (offering or accepting) Counterfeit currency (passing/possession \$1,000 to \$19,999) Drugs: Marihuana, possession with intent to distribute/sale (small scale (e.g., less than 50 lb)). "Soft drugs", possession with intent to distribute/sale (less than \$500). Escape (secure program or institution, or absent 7 d or more—no fear or threat used). Firearms Act, possession/purchase/sale (single weapon: not sawed-off shotgun or machine gun). Income tax evasion (\$10,000 to \$50,000) Mailing threatening communication(s) Misprison of felony Property offenses (theft/forgery/fraud/embezzlement/interstate transportation of stolen or forged securities/receiving stolen property) \$1,000 to \$19,999. Smuggling/transportation of alien(s) Theft of motor vehicle (not multiple theft for resale)	6-10	8-12	10-14	12-18
	8-12	12-16	16-20	20-26
	9-13	13-17	17-21	21-28

70a

High: Counterfeit currency (passing/possession \$20,000 to \$100,000) Counterfeiting (manufacturing) Drugs: Marihuana, possession with intent to distribute/sale (medium scale (e.g., 50 to 1,999 lbs)). "Soft drugs", possession with intent to distribute/sale (\$500 to \$5,000) Explosives, possession/transportation Firearms Act, possession/purchase/sale (sawed-off shotgun(s), machine gun(s), or multiple weapons) Mann Act (no force—commercial purposes) Theft of motor vehicle for resale Property offenses (theft/forgery/fraud/embezzlement/interstate transportation of stolen or forged securities/receiving stolen property) \$20,000 to \$100,000. Very high: Robbery (weapon or threat) Breaking and entering (bank or post office-entry or attempted entry to vault) Drugs: Marihuana, possession with intent to distribute/sale (large scale (e.g., 2,000 lb or more)). "Soft drugs", possession with intent to distribute/sale (over \$5,000) "Hard drugs", possession with intent to distribute/sale (not exceeding \$100,000). Extortion Mann Act (force) Property offenses (theft/forgery/fraud/embezzlement/interstate transportation of stolen or forged securities/receiving stolen property) over \$100,000 not not exceeding \$500,000. Sexual act (force)	12-16	16-20	20-26	26-32
	20-27	27-34	34-41	41-48

71a

Offense characteristics—severity of offense behavior
(examples)

Offender characteristics—parole prognosis
(salient factor score) (in months)

Very good (11 to 9)	Good (8 to 6)	Fair (5 to 4)	Poor (3 to 0)
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Greatest:

Aggravated felony (e.g., robbery, sexual act, aggravated assault)—weapon
fired or personal injury.
Aircraft hijacking
Drugs: "Hard drugs", possession with intent to distribute/sale (in excess
of \$100,000).
Espionage
Explosives (detonation)
Kidnapping
Willful homicide

Greater than above—however, specific ranges
are not given due to the limited number of
cases and the extreme variation in severity
possible within the category.

Willful homicide

Notes.—1. These guidelines are predicated upon good institutional conduct and program performance.

2. If an offense behavior is not listed above, the proper category may be obtained by comparing the severity of the offense behavior with those of similar offense behaviors listed.

3. If an offense behavior can be classified under more than 1 category, the most serious applicable category is to be used.

4. If an offense behavior involved multiple separate offenses, the severity level may be increased.

5. If a continuance is to be given, allow 30 d (1 mo) for release program provision.

6. "Hard drugs" include heroin, cocaine, morphine, or opiate derivatives, and synthetic opiate substitutes. "Soft drugs" include, but are not limited to, barbiturates, amphetamines, LSD, and hashish.

7. Conspiracy shall be rated for guideline purposes according to the underlying offense behavior if such behavior was consummated. If the offense is unconsummated, the conspiracy will be rated one step below the consummated offense.

72a

SALIENT FACTOR SCORE

Case name	Register No.
Item A	<input type="checkbox"/>
No prior convictions (adult or juvenile)=3.	<input type="checkbox"/>
1 prior conviction=2.	
2 or 3 prior convictions=1.	
4 or more prior convictions=0.	
Item B	<input type="checkbox"/>
No prior incarcerations (adult or juvenile)=2.	
1 or 2 prior incarcerations=1.	
3 or more prior incarcerations=0.	
Item C	<input type="checkbox"/>
Age at first commitment (adult or juvenile):	
26 or older=2.	
18 to 25=1.	
17 or younger=0.	
Item D	<input type="checkbox"/>
Commitment offense did not involve auto theft or check(s) (forgery/larceny)=1.	
Commitment offense involved auto theft or check(s)=0.	
Item E	<input type="checkbox"/>
Never had parole revoked or been committed for a new offense while on parole, and not a probation violator this time=1.	
Has had parole revoked or been committed for a new offense while on parole, or is a probation violator this time=0.	
Item F	<input type="checkbox"/>
No history of heroin or opiate dependence=1.	
Otherwise=0.	
Item G	<input type="checkbox"/>
Verified employment (or full-time school attendance) for a total of at least 6 mo during the last 2 yr in the community=1.	
Otherwise=0.	
Total score	<input type="checkbox"/>

73a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 77-1679 and 77-1858

JOHN M. GERAGHTY, indiv. and on
behalf of a class

vs.

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF UNITED STATES
and
SUPERINTENDENT FEDERAL PRISON
Allenwood, Pa.GERAGHTY, JOHN M., indiv. and on behalf of a
class, Appellant in No. 77-1679ELIEZER BECHER,
Appellant in No. 77-1858
(D. C. Civil No. 76-1467)ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIAPresent: ADAMS and GARTH, *Circuit Judges* and
LACEY, *District Judge**

* United States District Judge for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the record from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania and was argued by counsel on October 21, 1977.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the order of the said District Court, filed February 24, 1977, and appealed at our No. 77-1679, and the order of the said District Court, filed May 11, 1977 and appealed at our No. 77-1858, be, and the same are hereby reversed and the cause remanded for action in accordance with the opinion of this Court. Costs taxed in favor of appellant in No. 77-1679 only.

ATTEST:

/s/ THOMAS F. QUINN
Clerk

March 9, 1978

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 77-1679, 77-1858

JOHN M. GERAGHTY, etc.

v.

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, et al.,
Appellees

Geraghty, appellant in 77-1679
Becher, appellant in 77-1858

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
EN BANC

Present: SEITZ, Chief Judge, ALDISERT, ADAMS, GIBBONS, ROSENN, HUNTER, WEIS, GARTH and HIGGINBOTHAM, *Circuit Judges*.

The petition for rehearing filed by Appellees in the above entitled case having been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this court and to all the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service not having voted for rehearing by the court in banc, the petition for rehearing is denied.

By the Court,
/s/ ARLEN M. ADAMS
Circuit Judge

Dated: May 8, 1978

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
John M. GERAGHTY, Individually and on
behalf of a class, Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, et al.,
Respondents.

Civ. No. 76-1467.

[Filed Feb. 24, 1977.]

MEMORANDUM

HERMAN, District Judge.

Petitioner, John M. Geraghty, is presently an inmate at the Federal Community Treatment Center, Chicago, Illinois,¹ serving a 30 month sentence² imposed by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for the offenses of conspiracy to commit extortion, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and false declarations to a grand jury, 18 U.S.C. § 1623. On appeal, petitioner's conviction was affirmed. *United States v. Braasch*, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir.

¹ At the time the petition was filed and at the time the action was transferred to this district, petitioner was an inmate at the Allenwood Federal Prison Camp, Montgomery, Pennsylvania.

² Petitioner was initially sentenced to a term of 48 months. This sentence was reduced to 30 months in a proceeding under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. *United States v. Braasch*, No. 72 CR 979 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 9, 1975), aff'd., 542 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1976). Petitioner's motion for further relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was denied on December 21, 1976. *Geraghty v. United States*, No. 76 C 4215 (N.D. Ill.).

1974). Certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).

On September 15, 1976, petitioner, through retained counsel, filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. By order dated November 12, 1976, the Honorable Joseph C. Waddy construed the action as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and transferred the action to this Court. This Court issued a rule to show cause (Document 5, filed December 7, 1976) in response to which respondent has filed a motion for summary judgment and a brief in support thereof. Respondent has opposed petitioner's motion for summary judgment. Because the issues presented are issues of law, no evidentiary hearing is required. 28 U.S.C. § 2243; *deVyver v. Warden, U. S. Penitentiary*, 388 F.Supp. 1213 (M.D.Pa.1974). Thus, the case is ripe for disposition.

The substantive issues raised by Geraghty's petition concern the decision of the United States Parole Commission not to release him on parole. From the record before the Court, it appears that in June 1976, petitioner was considered for parole. 28 C.F.R. § 2.14 (1976). Petitioner's case was designated an "original jurisdiction" case referred to the National Commissioners for decision. 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.17 and 2.13(b) (1976). On July 7, 1976, the National Commissioners denied parole and continued petitioner until the expiration of his term for the stated reasons that:

"Your offense behavior has been rated as very high severity because it involved extortion. You have a salient factor score of 11. You have been in custody for a total of 9 months. Guidelines established by the Commission for adult cases which consider the above cases indicate a range of 26-36 months to be served before release for cases with good institutional program performance and adjustment. After review of all relevant factors and information presented, a decision outside the guidelines at this consideration is not found warranted."

Petitioner appealed to the National Appeals Board, 28 C.F.R. § 2.27 (1976), which, on October 19, 1976, affirmed the decision of the National Commissioners.

JURISDICTION

As noted above, Judge Waddy construed this action as a habeas corpus action.³ Nevertheless, petitioner has persisted in asserting that there is a separate declaratory and injunctive aspect to the case, jurisdiction for which is alleged under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1361.⁴ The Court concurs in Judge Waddy's reading of the complaint and finds petitioner's contention to be completely without merit. The gist

³ "A fair reading of the Complaint confirms that this is an action sounding essentially in habeas corpus, the statutory remedy to relieve illegal restraints on custody." *Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Commission*, Civil No. 76-1729 (D.D.C., filed November 12, 1976) (Waddy, J.).

⁴ See Document 2; Document 3 at 4; and Document 9 at 6 n.2 and at 9-10.

of petitioner's action is a challenge to the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act (PCRA),⁵ the guidelines promulgated by the Commission,⁶ and the Parole Commission's decision denying petitioner's release on parole. As such, the action presents a claim that petitioner is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The "declaratory" and "injunctive" relief sought by petitioner against the Parole Commission is, in effect, a request for a ruling that petitioner is entitled to release on parole.⁷ Thus, the action falls squarely within the class of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); see *Gerstein v. Pugh*, 420 U.S. 103, 107 n.6 (1975); *Wolff v. McDonnell*, 418 U.S. 539, 554-555 (1974); *United States ex rel. Marrero v. Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary*, 483 F.2d 656, 659-660 (3d Cir. 1973); *rev'd on other grounds*, 417 U.S. 653 (1974); *Battle v. Norton*, 365 F.Supp. 925 (D.Comm.1973); cf. *Ricketts v. Ciccone*, 371 F.Supp. 1249 (W.D.Mo.1974). Consequently, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides the sole jurisdictional basis for this action.

⁵ Pub.L. 94-233, § 2 (Mar. 15, 1976), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4201 et seq. (1976).

⁶ 28 C.F.R. § 2.1 et seq. (1976).

⁷ The "irreparable harm" alleged in support of the claim for injunctive relief is the denial of parole and the resulting continued confinement. See Complaint, paragraph 53.

MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS

Petitioner purports to bring this habeas corpus action as a class action.⁸ The complaint contains class allegations, and a motion to certify the class was filed with the complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. That motion was not acted upon by Judge Waddy and is presently before this Court. Petitioner has pressed for, and respondents have opposed, certification before both the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and this Court.

For the reasons stated in *United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser*, 506 F.2d 1115, 1125 (2d Cir. 1974), *cert. denied*, 421 U.S. 921 (1975), the Court holds that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. *Accord Bijeol v. Benson*, 513 F.2d. 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1975); but see *Williams v. Richardson*, 481 F.2d 358, 361 (8th Cir. 1973); *Mead v. Parker*, 464 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1972); *Adderly v. Wainwright*, 58 F.R.D. 389 (M.D. Fla. 1972). Despite the technical nonapplicability of Rule 23, procedures analogous to a class action have been fashioned in habeas corpus actions where necessary and appropriate. *United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser*, *supra*; *Bijeol v. Benson*, *supra*; see

⁸ For the reasons stated in the preceding discussion on jurisdiction, the Court will not address petitioner's contention, Document 14 at 9-10, that the action is "an ordinary civil action to which the class act provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 [apply]. . . ."

Williams v. Richardson, supra; *Mead v. Parker*, supra; *Adderly v. Wainwright*, supra.

In this case, class certification is neither necessary nor appropriate. Petitioner contends that class certification is necessary to ensure that the legal issues presented do not evade appellate review. This contention is based on petitioner's concern that his sentence will expire and thereby moot any appeal from this Court's decision. The motion for class certification represents petitioner's attempt to structure his suit to fit into the exception to the mootness doctrine enunciated in *Sosna v. Iowa*, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); see e.g., *Gerstein v. Pugh*, supra, 420 U.S. at 110 n.11. However, the possibility of mootness on appeal is not a proper consideration for determining whether or not the action should be maintained as a class action. Cf. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. (setting for the prerequisites to a class action). The issues petitioner raises may be litigated without the presence of a class.

Class certification is inappropriate for several reasons. Two of the issues raised—the Commission's characterization of petitioner's offense as extortion and access to certain Commission files—relate solely to petitioner's individual case and have no class-wide applicability.⁹ Cf. *LoCicero v. Day*, 518 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1975). Another issue—the applicability of the

⁹ The class sought to be certified is "all federal prisoners who have been or will become eligible for release on parole," Document 1 (Complaint, paragraph 5(a); and motion).

guidelines, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1976) to prisoners sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (1958)—is similarly inapplicable to all the members of the proposed class. The remaining issues—the constitutionality of the PCRA and the guidelines—do present questions of law common to the class; however, not all members of the class have the same interest as petitioner. For example, prisoners who are, or will be, paroled under the PCRA and the guidelines clearly do not have the same interest as petitioner in seeking to have the statute declared unconstitutional. Thus, petitioner's claims are not typical of those of the proposed class. Cf. Rule 23(a)(3) of the Fed.R.Civ.P.; see *Sosna v. Iowa*, supra 419 U.S. at 403 and n.13. Furthermore, this Court does not have habeas corpus jurisdiction over all the members of the proposed class. *Fitzgerald v. Sigler*, 372 F.Supp. 889, 899 (D.D.C.1974); see *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973) (habeas corpus jurisdiction if custodian can be reached by service of process); but see *United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser*, supra at 1127-1130.

Consequently, petitioner's motion for class certification will be denied.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Petitioner's pleadings present a broad attack on both the PCRA and the guidelines authorized by the statute. Petitioner claims that the PCRA is "facially" unconstitutional (Complaint, paragraph 5(b)(1)) be-

cause it vests the Parole Commission with the power to make deferred sentencing decisions, i. e. determinations of "just punishment," without proper due process safeguards and in violation of the constitutional ex post facto prohibition (Complaint, paragraphs 23 and 24). Petitioner apparently attacks the guidelines, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1976) for the same reason (Document 14 at 35) and for the additional reason that the guidelines permit the Parole Commission to "superimpose upon federal criminal law a system of 'flat time sentencing'" (Document 14 at 16).

Petitioner's contentions equating parole and parole decision-making with sentencing reflect a misconception as to the nature of parole. There are "clear differences" between parole and sentencing. *United States ex. rel. Marrero v. Warden, Lewisburg, Penitentiary*, supra 483 F.2d at 661. Sentencing is the imposition of legislatively authorized punishment on one guilty of the commission of a crime. "The essence of parole is release from prison, before the completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the sentence." *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972). Parole involves making a decision whether the eligible prisoner should serve his sentence in confinement or in society upon certain conditions. Thus, parole involves "implementing a prisoner's sentence," and "does not involve modification of the sentence." *United States ex rel. Marrero v. Warden*, supra, 483 F.2d at 661. Petitioner's contentions equating parole and sentencing

are, therefore, completely without merit. Parole is not a form of sentencing or a modification of sentence.¹⁰

Another broad attack on the guidelines is petitioner's contention that they are inconsistent with the PCRA. In particular, petitioner contends that the PCRA is "a major penal reform measure" which creates "vastly modified parole release criteria" (Document 14 at 20 and 25), that the Commission's guidelines under the prior act¹¹ have been repromulgated as the current guidelines (Document 14 at 28), and therefore, that the current guidelines reflect the parole release criteria under the prior act rather than those set forth in the PCRA.

It is hard to read the prior Act and the PCRA and its legislative history without coming to a conclusion completely contrary to petitioner's. The parole release criteria under the prior act were: (1) a reasonable probability that the prisoner would remain at liberty without violating the law; and (2) the compatibility of the prisoner's release with the welfare of society. 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a)(1970); see *Wiley v. United States Board of Parole*, 380 F.Supp. 1194

¹⁰ See *Roach v. Board of Pardons and Paroles, State of Arkansas*, 503 F.2d 1367, 1368 (8th Cir. 1974) ("... [P]arole is a supervised release from incarceration prior to the termination of sentence. ... Therefore, [parole denial does not increase the sentence]. . ."); *Garcia v. U.S. Board of Parole*, 409 F.Supp. 1230, 1239 (N.D.Ill.1976) (use of guidelines is not a *per se* usurpation of sentencing).

¹¹ Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 854.

(M.D.Pa.1974). The prisoner's observance of the rules of the institution in which he was confined was set forth as a condition of eligibility for parole. 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1951). Under the PCRA, the parole release criteria are:

“§ 4206. *Parole determination criteria*

(a) If an eligible prisoner has substantially observed the rules of the institution or institutions to which he has been confined, and if the Commission, upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the prisoner, determines:

(1) that release would not depreciate the seriousness of the offense or promote disrespect for the law; and

(2) that release would not jeopardize the public welfare;”

As is readily apparent from a comparison of the two acts, the parole release criteria are substantially the same. Although institutional performance is now a parole release criterion rather than a condition of eligibility, the difference in characterization is not substantive. The “depreciate the seriousness of the offense” language in the PCRA is language specifically upheld in this district as complying with the statutory criteria of the prior act. *Wiley v. United States Board of Parole*, supra; *deVyver v. Warden, U. S. Penitentiary*, supra, 388 F.Supp. at 1224; see

Garcia v. U. S. Board of Parole, 409 F.Supp. 1230, 1234 (N.D.Ill.1976).

Therefore, although the PCRA restates the criteria under the prior act, it does not significantly change them.¹²

Nevertheless, petitioner contends that the PCRA places a greater emphasis on “the nature and circumstances of the offense” than did the prior act (Document 14 at 28). There is absolutely no basis for petitioner's contention. The statute itself, 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (a) (1976) places no undue emphasis on the nature and circumstances of the offense. Indeed, it directs the Parole Commission to make its determination “upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense *and* the history and characteristics of the prisoner.” (Emphasis added). The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference confirms that the nature and circumstances of the offense is to be considered *together with*, rather than given emphasis over, the history and characteristics of the prisoner:

“ . . . [I]t is the intent of the Conferees that the Parole Commission review and consider *both* the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the prisoner. It is

¹² See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), 3 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 353 (“The legislation provides a *new statement* of criteria . . .” (Emphasis added)).

the view of the Conferees that *these two items* are most significant in making equitable release determinations and are a viable basis, *when considered together*, for making other judgments required by this section." (Emphasis added).

Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), 3 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 358 (1976). In explaining a related section of the PCRA, the information to be considered by the Parole Commission 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1976), the Committee of Conference specifically stated that the weight to be given any particular factor is "solely within the province of the (commission's) broad discretion." 3 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 360 (1976).

Petitioner's entire argument that the guidelines are inconsistent with the PCRA because they are merely a repromulgation of the old guidelines whereas Congress intended to vastly modify the parole release criteria is emphatically rejected by a reading of the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference. The Statement makes it quite clear that Congress not only intended to incorporate the guidelines, as developed under the prior act, into the PCRA, but also attempted thereby to remove doubt as to their legality:

"... [T]he Parole Board began reorganization in 1973 *along the lines of the legislation presented here.*

"The organization of parole decision-making along regional lines, the use of hearing examiners to prepare recommendations for action, *and, most importantly, the promulgation of guidelines* to make parole less disparate and more understandable *has met with such success that this legislation incorporates the system into the statute*, removes doubt as to the legality of changes implemented by administrative reorganization, and makes the improvements permanent." (Emphasis added). 3 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 352-353 (1976).

A third contention of petitioner's is that the guidelines are unlawful because they repeal by administrative fiat the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (1958)¹³ (Document 14 at 40 and 43). What petitioner is really claiming is that the Commission's guidelines should not be applied to a prisoner, such as himself, who was sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (1958). Petitioner's contention has been previously rejected in this district for reasons which are equally applicable under the PCRA:

"It should be noted that 18 U.S.C.A. § 4208(a)(2) is used by the sentencing court to determine when a prisoner can be considered for release on

¹³ 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) provides in relevant part: "(a) Upon entering a judgment of conviction, . . . for a term exceeding one year, . . . (2) the court may fix the maximum sentence of imprisonment to be served in which event the court may specify that the prisoner may become eligible for parole at such time as the board of parole may determine."

parole, and does not affect the Board's discretion in determining whether parole should be granted. . . . Section 4208(a)(2) merely eliminates the requirement of 18 U.S.C.A. § 4202 that a prisoner serve one-third of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole consideration. Section 4208(a)(2) does not annul or modify the statutory requirements with respect to suitability for parole release embodied in 18 U.S.C.A. § 4203 and the Board's paroling guidelines promulgated thereunder, 39 Fed.Reg. § 2.20 (1974). Thus, a prisoner sentenced under Section 4208(a)(2) is subject to the same substantive parole release standards as all other inmates."

Stroud v. Weger, 380 F.Supp. 897, 899 (M.D.Pa. 1974).

United States v. Hawthorne, 532 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1976) and *United States v. Salerno*, 538 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir. 1976), cited to the Court by petitioner, do not overrule *Stroud*. *Hawthorne* held that a sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1951) is "harsher" than an identical sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (1958) for the reason that § 4208(a)(2) (1958) "creates the possibility of release from incarceration prior to the . . . one-third point in the [§ 4202] sentence . . ." 532 F.2d at 324. The case in no way involved the applicability of the guidelines to a prisoner sentenced under § 4208(a)(2) (1958). *Salerno*, also, is inapposite. *Salerno* involved a question

of whether the sentencing judge's expectations were frustrated by the Parole Board's subsequent promulgation of its guidelines. The Third Circuit found that the sentencing judge's expectations had been frustrated, and remanded to the district court for a correction of sentence. The applicability of the guidelines to a prisoner, such as petitioner, who was sentenced under § 4208(a)(2) by a court *fully aware of the guidelines*,¹⁴ was not at issue in *Salerno*.

Petitioner complains that the Commission characterized his offense as "extortion," an offense listed in the "very high" severity of the Commission's Adult guidelines. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1976). Petitioner maintains that although he was convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, his offense is something "other than extortion because it did not involve force, threats or violence. The Court is surprised by petitioner's argument. As respondents correctly note, petitioner's offense involved obtaining money under color of official right. See *United States v. Braasch*, supra, 505 F.2d 139. The statute under which petitioner was convicted specifically defines such an offense as extortion. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2).

Petitioner contends that until he filed this suit, the Parole Commission denied him access to a "hearing summary" of a parole hearing *prior* to the one at

¹⁴ Petitioner's sentence was corrected by a court which was fully aware of the Parole Board's guidelines. See *Geraghty v. United States*, No. 76 C 4215 (N.D.Ill., Dec. 21, 1976), cited in note 2 *infra*.

issue here.¹⁵ Petitioner maintains that the Commission's denial of access prevented him from "any opportunity to learn the facts relied upon by the hearing examiner panel . . . [in classifying his offense as] 'very high severity,'" see Document 12, and thereby prevented him from fully challenging the facts on which the Commission relied (see Document 14 at 43-44). Petitioner's contention provides no basis for relief from the Commission's decision denying parole. The Notice of Action, dated July 7, 1976, informed petitioner that his offense was classified "very high" severity because it involved extortion. That statement was sufficient to put petitioner on notice as to the reason for the Commission's action. Moreover, in light of petitioner's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and the Seventh Circuit's affirmance of his conviction, it is hard to imagine how petitioner could effectively challenge the facts on which the Commission relied. Thus, the error, if any, in denying petitioner's access to his December 1975 hearing summary was harmless.

Based on the record and the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that the Commission "followed criteria appropriate, rational and consistent with the statute [the PCRA] and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious, nor based on impermissible considerations." *Zannino v. Arnold*, 531 F.2d 687, 690

¹⁵ Petitioner does not allege that the Commission denied him access to its records of the June 1976 parole hearing, records which he would be entitled to under the PCRA. 18 U.S.C. § 4208(f). The hearing summary sought by petitioner relates to a December, 1975 parole hearing not at issue here.

(3d Cir. 1976). Accordingly, the Court will deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and will dismiss the action.

The foregoing shall constitute the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.

/s/ R. DIXON HERMAN
R. Dixon Herman
United States District Judge

Dated: February 24, 1977.